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ExEcutivE summary
•	 Since	 June	 2014,	 Islamic	 State	 (IS)	 has	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	
principal	 security	 threat	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 one	 of	 the	
most	important	problems	for	European	and	global	security.	Is-
lamic	State,	which	for	many	years	was	just	one	of	many	terror	
organisations	with	links	to	al-Qaeda,	has	succeeded	in	achiev-
ing	much	more	than	other	similar	organisations:	it	has	taken	
over	control	of	large	swathes	of	territory	in	Syria	and	Iraq	by	
military	means,	created	its	own	para-state	structures	in	that	
area,	and	become	the	greatest	civilisational	challenge	for	the	
region	 in	 a	 century	 as	 it	 established	 a	 self-proclaimed	 cali-
phate	and	credibly	pledged	to	expand	further	on	a	global	scale.	
Those	successes	have	been	accompanied	by	widely	publicised	
acts	of	systemic	brutality	which	meets	the	definition	of	crimes	
against	humanity.	One	outcome	of	these	developments	is	the	
emergence	of	an	exotic	informal	alliance	to	combat	the	Islamic	
State,	which	has	brought	together	all	the	states	from	the	Mid-
dle	East	and	many	from	beyond	the	region.	However,	contrary	
to	what	could	have	been	predicted,	after	almost	a	year	of	the	
declared	war	against	IS,	the	Caliphate	still	holds	most	of	the	
ground	it	gained	in	2014.
•	 Islamic	State	 is	 a	 real	 and	 serious	problem	 that	must	not	be	
taken	 lightly.	However,	 it	 is	a	 fundamental	mistake	 to	 focus	
attention	on	IS	alone,	without	taking	into	account	the	context	
in	which	it	was	established	and	operates.	The	gradual	disin-
tegration	of	the	political,	social	and	civilisational	order	in	the	
Middle	East,	a	process	which	has	been	particularly	dynamic	
over	the	last	decade,	is	crucial	in	this	respect:	individual	states	
in	 the	 region	 have	 been	 experiencing	 deep	 crises,	 and	 the	
model	of	the	state	itself	has	come	into	crisis.	The	role	of	non-	
-state	actors	has	increased	exponentially;	a	deep	reassessment	
of	identities	has	taken	place,	and	the	delicately	balanced	and	
dynamic	 regional	 security	 system	has	 started	 to	 implode	 as	
a	result	of	the	regional	proxy	war	in	which	nearly	all	the	states	
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of	the	region,	as	well	as	influential	external	players,	have	been	
involved	for	years.	The	emergence	of	Islamic	State	is	the	effect	
and	not	the	primary	cause	here,	a	living	proof	of	the	scale	of	
the	problems.	Islamic	State	aspires,	not	entirely	unjustifiably,	
to	the	role	of	an	independent	actor,	and	even	today	is	actively	
and	effectively	stimulating	the	Middle	Eastern	crisis.
•	 While	certainly	justified,	the	fight	against	Islamic	State	is	ex-
tremely	difficult,	albeit	not	so	much	militarily	as	politically.	
Today	no	 realistic	 plan	 exists	 for	 a	 sustainable	 stabilisation	
of	the	region	following	the	putative	defeat	of	IS,	and	even	the	
prospect	of	eliminating	the	symptoms	of	Islamic	State’s	activ-
ity	in	the	area	currently	under	its	influence	(e.g.	terrorism)	is	
highly	uncertain.	This	demonstrates	that	Islamic	State	is	not	
the	cause,	but	one	of	the	painful	symptoms	of	a	wider	crisis	in	
the	Middle	East.
•	 Islamic	State	embodies	 the	 strategic	 challenges	 faced	by	 the	
West	(the	Euro-Atlantic	community)	in	the	Middle	East.	In	the	
short	term,	this	concerns	the	costs	and	risks	involved	in	the	
struggle	to	contain	terrorism	and	other	soft	security	impacts	
(such	as	migrations),	and	in	the	medium	term,	the	potential	
consequences	 of	 the	presence	of	 large	 immigrant	 communi-
ties	 from	 the	Middle	East	 in	 the	EU	 (although	 these	 are	not	
the	subject	of	this	analysis).	In	a	broader	sense,	this	is	a	prob-
lem	without	precedent	 in	 the	 last	 two	 centuries:	 a	 situation	
in	which	the	West	is	losing	its	strategic	initiative	in	the	Mid-
dle	 Eastern	 neighbourhood,	 and	 the	 political,	 civilisational	
and	military	instruments	which	have	so	far	safeguarded	the	
West’s	basic	interests	(especially	in	the	sphere	of	security)	are	
in	crisis.	The	system	aimed	at	actively	promoting	the	Western	
model	in	the	region	seems	to	have	lost	its	appeal	and	collapsed	
over	the	last	decade,	and	a	new	approach	to	developing	a	threat	
containment	 strategy	 is	 now	 necessary.	 It	 remains	 an	 open	
question	as	to	whether	the	widening	vacuum	left	by	the	West	
will	be	filled	by	the	existing,	ambitious	states	(such	as	Iran	or	
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Turkey),	or	whether	completely	new	forces	will	emerge.	In	any	
case,	for	the	West	solving	the	direct	problem	posed	by	Islamic	
State	would	merely	be	the	first	step	on	a	long	journey	into	the	
unknown.
•	 The	present	 text	was	drafted	on	the	basis	of	analysis	of	ma-
terials	available	online,	as	well	as	study	visits	and	numerous	
conversations	with	experts,	especially	from	Turkey,	Iran	and	
the	Kurdish	community.	 It	 is	not	a	monographic	study	of	 Is-
lamic	State.	Neither	does	 it	aspire	to	present	a	complete	and	
comprehensive	description	of	the	situation	in	the	Middle	East,	
because	a	number	of	detailed	monographic	studies	of	 Islam-
ic	State	are	already	available.1	Providing	a	full	description	of	
the	 complex	 and	dynamic	 situation	 in	 the	 region	would	not	
be	possible	here.	The	principal	objective	of	this	analysis	is	to	
present	the	problem	posed	by	Islamic	State	in	a	wider	context,	
and	to	put	forward	some	arguments	to	stimulate	reflection	on	
the	challenges	that	the	West	faces	in	connection	with	the	cri-
sis	in	the	Middle	East.	
1	 See	the	appendix	for	a	list	of	selected	studies	of	Islamic	State.
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i. islamic statE – tErrorism fulfillEd 
(a tEntativE ovErviEw of thE problEm)
1. Islamic State – portrait of a terror organisation2
Before	June	2014,	the	organisation	known	today	as,	Islamic	State	
was	a	typical	terror	organisation,	organically	linked	with	al-Qae-
da	and	centred	around	its	founder,	the	Jordanian	Abu	Musab	al-
-Zarqawi,	who	was	an	outstanding	al-Qaeda	commander.
The	history	 of	 Islamic	 State	 is	 the	 living	history	 of	 Sunni	 radi-
calism	and	terrorism.	Al-Zarqawi	was	a	 frustrated	volunteer	 in	
the	anti-Soviet	war	waged	by	the	Mujahidin	of	Afghanistan,	who	
had	been	sentenced	to	prison	for	terrorism	in	Jordan,	and	who	in	
1999	founded	the	organisation	Jamaat	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	which	
operated	within	the	orbit	of	Osama	bin	Laden	in	Afghanistan	un-
der	Taliban	rule.	He	fought	against	the	Americans	in	2001,	and	in	
2003	escaped	to	Iraq	via	Iran	to	take	over	leadership	of	the	most	
active	 Sunni	 communities	 fighting	 against	 the	 Americans	 and	
Shia	Muslims.	He	held	that	position	until	his	death	in	June	2006.	
Despite	 the	 serious	 crisis	 caused	 by	 al-Zarqawi’s	 death	 and	 the	
successes	 of	 the	US	 anti-terror	 operation,	 his	 organisation	 sur-
vived	in	Iraq,	stepped	up	its	activities	there	with	no	small	degree	
of	success	after	2011,	and	expanded	into	Syria,	itself	torn	by	a	civil	
war	since	2011,	while	at	the	same	time	intensifying	its	activities	in	
Iraq.	In	early	2014	the	organisation	ultimately	severed	its	ties	with	
al-Qaeda.	In	the	meantime,	it	changed	its	name	several	times:	be-
fore	it	became	Islamic	State,	it	was	known	under	such	names	as	
the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq,	then	the	Islamic	State	of	Syria	and	Iraq	
(ISIS,	ISIL	or	Daesh).	Since	2010,	its	leader	has	been	Abu	Bakr	al-
-Baghdadi.3
2	 For	a	more	extensive	bibliography,	see	the	appendix.
3	 Since	 29	 June	 2014	 he	 has	 presented	 himself	 as	 ‘Caliph	 Ibrahim’;	 his	 real	
name	is	Ibrahim	Awad	Ibrahim	al-Badri.
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In	the	course	of	its	history,	the	organisation	known	today	as	the	Is-
lamic	State	has	demonstrated	impressive	operational	capabilities	
in	conducting	terror	and	sabotage	activities.	Al-Zarqawi	and	his	
people	have	been	active	in	Jordan	and	Afghanistan,	and	reported-
ly	carried	out	operations	in	Morocco,	Turkey	and	Jordan	(a	foiled	
chemical	weapons	attack),	but	they	have	mainly	focused	on	their	
main	theatre,	Iraq	and	Syria.	They	have	conducted	effective	and	
sustained	campaigns	against	local	authorities	and	security	insti-
tutions,	as	well	as	against	specialised	US	forces	(2004–2008).
Islamic	 State’s	methods	 include	 individual	 terrorism,	 notorious	
bomb	attacks	 (using	 suicide	bombers	 and	 car	bombs),	 dramatic	
executions	(of	journalists,	aid	workers	and	others),	mass	killings,	
etc.	 IS	has	 targeted	 the	security	 forces	and	 the	army,	as	well	as	
civilians,	which	in	the	case	of	Iraq	means	Shia	Muslims	and	Shia	
religious	sites.	Islamic	State	has	demonstrated	its	impressive	or-
ganisational	potential	by,	 for	 instance,	 simultaneously	carrying	
out	a	series	of	bomb	attacks	in	distant	locations	in	Iraq,	or	by	effec-
tively	breaking	into	prisons	in	Iraq	in	order	to	release	actual	and	
potential	members	 (including	 the	 infamous	 Abu	Ghraib	 prison	
near	Baghdad	in	2013).	The	financing	arrangements	of	the	Islam-
ic	State	also	 testify	 to	 the	organisation’s	professionalism.	While	
similar	organisations	depend	 to	a	considerable	extent	on	exter-
nal	support	(donors	and	distributors	of	funding),	IS	has	developed	
its	own	large-scale	criminal	activities	(mostly	in	Iraq,	including	
racket	and	extortions),	thanks	to	which	it	has	been	financially	in-
dependent	for	years,	and	has	expanded	the	range	of	instruments	
at	its	disposal	to	influence	the	surrounding	world.
In	other	words,	while	on	the	one	hand	IS	is	a	typical	terror	organi-
sation,	on	the	other	it	has	demonstrated	an	outstanding	capabil-
ity	to	adapt	to	various	theatres	of	operations,	a	resilience	to	losses	
(for	instance,	by	withstanding	the	consequences	of	the	deaths	of	
its	 long-time	leader	al-Zarqawi	and	his	successors),	an	ability	to	
accumulate	experience,	and	an	openness	to	new	forms	of	activity.	
When	the	Islamic	State	seized	huge	swathes	of	territory	in	Syria	
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and	Iraq	in	2013–2014,	this	was	the	culmination	of	its	previous	ef-
forts,	and	at	the	same	time	moved	what	was	once	a	mere	terror	
group	to	a	new	level	of	military,	political	and	ideological	activity.
Islamic	State’s	relations	with	al-Qaeda	are	good	illustration	of	its	
specific	nature	and	strength.	For	more	than	a	dozen	years,	IS	used	
to	be	part	of	al-Qaeda’s	network,	and	acknowledged	the	latter’s	su-
periority.	However,	at	least	since	the	start	of	the	Iraqi	chapter,	it	
became	clear	that	Islamic	State’s	objectives	and	instruments	dif-
fered	from	those	of	the	parent	organisation.	First	and	foremost,	
unlike	 al-Qaeda,	 Islamic	 State’s	 terror	 attacks	have	mainly	 tar-
geted	the	Iraqi	state’s	structures	developed	under	the	auspices	of	
the	United	States,	as	well	as	the	US	forces	in	Iraq	and	civilian	Shia	
Muslims.	In	principle,	Islamic	State	did	not	carry	out	any	large-
scale	attacks	on	Western	targets	in	Europe	and	the	United	States,	
focusing	 instead	on	 the	 ‘near	 enemy’,	 i.e.	 the	Shia	Muslims,	 re-
garded	as	particularly	dangerous	heretics;	as	well	as,	inevitably,	
US	troops.	Unlike	al-Qaeda,	Islamic	State	did	aspire	to	take	over	
effective	control	of	 territory,	especially	of	 cities	 in	which	 it	had	
some	support	(e.g.	Fallujah),	which	necessitated	military	activity,	
and	not	just	terror	operations.	Finally,	Islamic	State	has	demon-
strated	a	great	openness	 (which	has	subsequently	 turned	out	to	
be	politically	profitable)	to	all	forces	and	communities	that	recog-
nised	the	same	enemies	(such	as	former	Ba’ath	party	functionar-
ies	and	Saddam	Husain’s	officers4),	even	if	they	did	not	necessarily	
share	 Islamic	State’s	radical	 Islamist	slogans).	 Islamic	State	still	
retains	these	characteristics	today;	its	‘typical’	terrorist	activities	
are	auxiliary	in	nature	and	are	focused	on	attacking	close	targets	
in	order	to	intimidate	enemies,	provoke	retaliation	and	consolidate	
IS’s	own	support	base.	The	most	notorious	acts	of	terror	commit-
ted	by	Islamic	State	since	its	advances	of	2014	have	been	remark-
ably	consistent	with	this	trend:	they	involved	the	mass	executions	
4	 For	 instance,	Abu	Muslim	al-Turkmani	and	Abu	Ali	al-Anbari,	 two	depu-
ties	of	the	Islamic	State’s	self-appointed	caliph,	were	former	officers	of	the	
Iraqi	army.
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of	captured	Iraqi	troops,	massacres	of	tribes	opposing	the	IS,	and	
the	executions	of	 foreigners	 (journalists,	prisoners	 and	others),	
and	were	isolated	acts	carried	out	on-site,	whose	impact	rested	on	
the	brutality	and	the	professional	mediatisation	of	 the	acts	 (e.g.	
execution	 footage	 posted	 online).5	 Al-Qaeda’s	 specific	 character	
and	strength	rested	and	continues	to	rest	on	the	notorious	attacks	
carried	 out	 in	 the	West,	 targeting	 symbolic	 locations	 and	 civil-
ians,	which	required	much	more	sophisticated	logistics	(starting	
from	the	attacks	of	11	September	2001,	to	the	attack	on	the	com-
muter	 train	 in	Madrid	 in	2004	and	the	London	underground	 in	
2005,	and	to	the	al-Qaeda-inspired	individual	‘lone	wolf ’	attacks	
such	as	the	shooting	at	the	Charlie Hebdo	office	in	Paris	in	January	
2015).	If	one	looks	at	IS’s	declarations	and	its	human	resources,	i.e.	
the	volunteers	and	supporters	it	has	in	Europe,	the	threat	posed	
by	the	Islamic	State	to	the	West	remains	merely	potential	for	the	
moment,	which	cannot	be	said	of	al-Qaeda.
The	differences	between	Islamic	State	and	al-Qaeda	became	even	
more	pronounced	in	the	course	of	last	year,	leading	to	the	emer-
gence	of	 two	competing	models	of	 terrorism.	Al-Qaeda	remains	
the	centre	of	an	extensive	and	apparently	weakly	integrated	ter-
ror	network,	 a	kind	of	 franchise	 trademark	with	 aspirations	 to	
co-ordinate	global	action	against	the	‘crusaders’.	Islamic	State,	on	
the	other	hand,	has	become	a	model	of	how	to	build	and	consoli-
date	influence	in	a	defined	area.	It	aspires	to	the	status	of	a	state,	
and	is	focused	on	local	and	regional	activities.	It	has	been	building	
its	global	influence	not	by	expanding	a	network,	but	rather	by	cre-
ating	an	attractive	centre	of	gravity	–	its	‘state’	or	‘caliphate’	–	for	
existing	groups.
In	other	words,	a	huge	split	has	occurred	within	al-Qaeda,	related	
not	so	much	to	personal	or	prestige	issues	as	to	the	very	strategy	
5	 The	mediatisation	of	the	acts	of	destruction	of	pre-Islamic	monuments	by	
the	IS	complements	this	approach:	these	efforts	are	also	intended	to	provide	
publicity	and	show	the	uncompromising	character	of	the	organisation’s	ide-
ology	and	methods.
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of	action;	and	in	this	way,	competition	has	appeared	within	the	
mainstream	of	Sunni	terrorism,	stimulating	its	growth.
2. Islamic State – terrorists with an army
What	clearly	sets	Islamic	State	apart	from	most	of	the	other	ter-
ror	organisations	in	the	Middle	East	is	that	it	has	created	its	own	
army.6	The	organisation	had	been	working	towards	this	objective	
for	years	(see	‘IS	in	Iraq’	previously)	and	had	stepped	up	its	efforts	
upon	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 in	 Syria.	 In	 theory,	 Islamic	
State	is	no	different	from	the	other	groupings	conducting	military	
operations	in	Syria	which	aspire	to	take	permanent	control	over	
territory.	In	practice,	however,	the	‘caliphate’	is	the	only	organisa-
tion	to	have	created	a	regular	armed	force,	one	that	has	not	been	
bogged	 down	 in	 trench	warfare	 and	 local	 clashes	 in	 Syria,	 but	
which	has	proved	capable,	having	been	tasked	with	a	well-defined	
political	 objective,	 of	 quickly	 defeating	 the	 stronger,	 nominally	
professional	and	well-armed	Iraqi	forces;	scoring	a	number	of	tac-
tical	victories	over	the	paramilitary	Kurdish	units	(the	Peshmer-
ga)	who	until	now	had	been	considered	 to	be	a	difficult	 enemy;	
seizing	Mosul,	Iraq’s	second	largest	city,	in	addition	to	many	other	
towns;	and	posing	a	threat	to	Baghdad	itself	on	a	number	of	occa-
sions.	Islamic	State’s	forces	emerged	radically	strengthened	from	
the	 offensive,	 having	 seized	 the	 Iraqi	 army’s	weapons	 or	 taken	
over	abandoned	arms	caches.	Despite	Baghdad’s	efforts,	and	the	
support	it	received	from	powers	ranging	from	the	United	States	
to	 Iran,	air	strikes	by	coalition	 forces,	etc.,	 Islamic	State	has	ef-
fectively	held	its	ground.
Islamic	 State’s	 military	 actions	 are	 notorious	 for	 their	 brutal-
ity	and	totality,	with	the	killings	of	prisoners,	extermination	of	
6	 No	clear	and	reliable	figures	are	available;	estimates	range	from	20,000	to	
200,000.	It	may	be	assumed	that	the	army	has	several	tens	of	thousands	of	
more	or	less	regular	forces	in	Iraq	and	Syria,	a	considerable	mobilisation	po-
tential,	and	irregular	and	only	symbolically	controlled	forces	that	recognise	
the	superiority	of	the	IS	beyond	Iraq	and	Syria.
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civilians,	 ethnic	 and	 confessional	 cleansing	 (e.g.	 Yazidis),	mass	
rape	and	the	alleged	use	of	chemical	weapons,	all	of	which	seems	
to	be	the	consequence	of	the	organisation’s	terrorist	background.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	brutality	is	intended	to	intimidate	enemies,	
but	on	the	other,	 it	 leads	to	real	and	irreversible	changes	 in	the	
region’s	social	structure.
The	actions	–	and	advances	–	of	Islamic	State	since	2014	have	ex-
posed	the	weakness	and	limitations	of	Iraq	and	the	coalition	fight-
ing	 the	 ‘caliphate’,	 but	 also	 its	 real	military	 power.	 This	 power	
stems	from	a	number	of	 factors	 including	well-defined	military	
objectives,	high	morale	and	training	level,	and	good	commander-
ship.	Even	more	than	its	terror	activities,	Islamic	State’s	military	
dimension	demonstrates	 the	 organisation’s	 inclusive	nature:	 its	
military	operations	involve	officers	and	troops	who	used	to	serve	
in	Iraq’s	regular	army	in	Saddam	Hussain’s	time,	as	well	as	foreign	
professionals,	especially	Chechens	from	Georgia	and	the	Russian	
Federation.	Even	though	Islamic	State’s	offensive	has	been	effec-
tively	 stopped	 and	 the	 organisation	 has	 sustained	 losses	 in	 the	
coalition	air	strikes,	it	has	retained	its	military	potential.
3. Islamic State – (re)building the caliphate
The	Islamic	State	has	brought	a	new	quality	into	Middle	Eastern	
relations,	not	so	much	because	of	its	terrorist	or	military	potential	
(which	is	a	means	to	an	end),	but	rather	because	it	has	been	try-
ing	to	establish	a	state	–	a	state	whose	emergence	may	shake	the	
entire	Middle	Eastern	(and	potentially	also	global)	order.
Firstly,	Islamic	State	has	seized	huge	swathes	of	the	territory	of	Iraq	
and	Syria	 (more	than	100,000	km2	 in	 total,	 inhabited	by	around	
8	million	people);	it	controls	this	territory	and	has	been	develop-
ing	administrative	structures	there.7	In	addition	to	the	army	(see	
7	 It	is	impossible	to	put	reliable	numbers	on	the	size	of	the	territory	controlled	
by	the	Islamic	State	or	its	population	because	of	the	highly	dynamic	situa-
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above),	Islamic	State	has	also	created	a	security	apparatus	and	a	ju-
diciary	system,	an	education	system	and	an	economic	system	com-
plete	with	taxes,	enterprises	and	its	own	currency.8	It	exerts	real	
influence	on	the	social	and	political	situation,	e.g.	by	eliminating	
potential	 enemies	 (through	 marginalisation,	 forced	 emigration,	
enslavement	or	mass	killings),	co-opting	potential	supporters	and	
building	up	its	own	support	base.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	para-
state	which	IS	has	been	building	is	founded	on	inclusive	principles:	
the	 IS	 hard	 core	 is	 surrounded	 by	 secular	 forces	 (former	 Ba’ath	
party	members),	numerous	Iraqi	tribes,	Sufi	groupings	(which	for	
religious	 reasons	are	 considered	 to	be	hostile),	 and	finally,	 large	
numbers	 of	 foreign	 volunteers.9	 Islamic	 State	 is	 in	 practice	 con-
ducting	a	foreign	policy,	in	particular	by	developing	co-operation	
with	similar	radical	groups,	but	also	by	negotiating	on	contentious	
issues	with	other	states	(e.g.	the	release	of	Turkish	hostages	held	in	
June	2014	in	Mosul).	The	fact	that	IS	controls	its	territory	and	has	
been	regularly	expanding	 it,	unhindered	by	the	governments	 in	
Damascus	and	Baghdad,	the	rival	militias,	interventions	by	exter-
nal	actors	(e.g.	Iran)	and	operations	by	the	US-led	coalition	(which	
have	been	underway	for	nearly	a	year),	proves	that	Islamic	State	is	
not	a	temporary	phenomenon.	It	also	considerably	strengthens	the	
basis	for	its	further	terror	and	military	activity.	Islamic	State	may	
(but	does	not	necessarily	have	to)	become	a	permanent	presence	in	
the	Middle	East.
Islamic	 State	 also	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 entire	 existing	 po-
litical	and	social	order	in	the	Middle	East.	 It	has	questioned	the	
tion	(including	migrations),	as	well	as	geographic	conditions	(the	problem	
with	assessing	the	degree	to	which	IS	controls	desert	areas).	Islamic	State	
controls	approximately	around	20–30%	of	the	territories	of	Syria	and	Iraq,	
inhabited	by	around	8	million	people.
8	 Gold,	 silver	 and	 copper	 dinars	 modelled	 on	 the	 coins	 of	 the	 8th-century	
Umayyad	 Caliphate.	 However,	 the	 new	 currency	 seems	 to	 have	 mainly	
symbolic	 and	 propagandistic	 importance,	 but	 little	 practical	 use	 for	 the	
moment.
9	 The	political	structures	are	nonetheless	dominated	by	Iraqi	Sunnis	of	Arab	
descent.
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legitimacy	 of	 the	 regimes	 in	 power,	 undermined	 the	 façade	 of	
republican	governance	modelled	on	Western	systems	 (by	 intro-
ducing	 the	 caliphate,	 i.e.	 a	 theocratic	 monarchy),	 and	 rejected	
the	concept	of	a	nation	as	the	basis	of	statehood,	replacing	it	with	
confessional	categories.	It	has	also	questioned	the	United	Nations’	
global	 system	governing	 the	 formation	of	new	states,	as	well	as	
the	regional	security	system	(which	had	been	dominated	by	the	
United	States	but	used	to	 take	the	 interests	of	 local	powers	 into	
account).	It	has	posed	a	direct	challenge	to	all	the	Arab	states	in	
the	region,	and	has	pledged	to	take	action	against	them.	It	is	sig-
nificant	 that	 Islamic	 State	 does	 not	 operate	within	 one	 state	 or	
part	 of	 it,	 but	 controls	 and	 unifies	 the	 territories	 of	 two	 states	
which	had	been	in	conflict	for	decades,	i.e.	Syria	and	Iraq.	It	has	
actively	 rejected	 existing	 international	 and	 political	 divisions,	
and	has	claimed	the	right	to	create	an	entirely	new	order.	In	the	
short	 term,	 Islamic	State	 remains	 focused	on	 the	area	 in	 its	vi-
cinity	(historical	Syria,	spanning	also	Jordan	and	Lebanon,	Israel	
(now	beyond	the	caliphate’s	reach),	and	historical	Mesopotamia,	
i.e.	Iraq).	In	the	longer	term,	it	aspires	to	rule	the	entire	Middle	
East	and	North	Africa,	and	symbolically	and	propagandistically,	
to	control	all	the	areas	inhabited	by	Muslims	now	and	in	the	past.
Finally,	Islamic	State	purports	to	be	acting	in	the	name	of	religion.	
This	 refers	not	 just	 to	 Islam	and	 Islamic	 law	as	 its	 foundations;	
the	declaration	of	a	caliphate	means	 that	 the	 IS	claims	a	super-
natural	right	to	lead	the	entire	Muslim	world,	aspires	to	restore	
its	mythical	unity	and	strength,	and	 lends	a	clearly	cosmic	and	
moral	character	to	 its	fight	against	the	enemies.	 Its	millenarian	
vow	to	unleash	a	world	war	(by	first	taking	jihad	to	Europe),	end	
global	history,	initiate	the	end	times	and	bring	on	Judgement	Day	
is	a	symbolic	measure	of	its	ambitions.	While	the	leaders	of	Islam-
ic	 State	 are	 essentially	pragmatic,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 such	declara-
tions	is	mainly	propagandistic,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	play	down	
such	views	and	beliefs	among	Islamic	State’s	elites	and	support-
ers.	With	its	para-state,	IS	has	also	gained	a	practical	strategic	ad-
vantage	over	al-Qaeda:	the	latter	sought	unsuccessfully	to	rebuild	
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the	caliphate,	and	has	now	been	overtaken	by	Islamic	State,	thus	
finding	itself	on	the	defensive.	The	caliphate,	despite	all	the	con-
troversies	 concerning	 its	 legality,	 has	 also	 become	 attractive	 to	
smaller	terror	organisations	scattered	around	the	world,	from	the	
Philippines	to	Pakistan,	from	the	Caucasus	to	Syria,	 Iraq,	Sinai,	
Libya,	 the	Maghreb	 and	Nigeria.	This	has	 elevated	 IS’s	prestige	
and	lent	more	credibility	to	the	ambitions	of	its	leaders	in	Raqqa.
In	 short,	 Islamic	 State	 has	 announced	 itself	 as	 an	 extremely	
strong	and	resilient	terror	organisation,	an	unexpectedly	power-
ful	military	force,	and	finally,	an	ambitious	and	effective	political	
subject	capable	of	creating	state	structures.	At	 the	same	time	 it	
is	 evidently	 totalitarian,	 systemically	 criminal	by	 international	
standards	 (with	 terrorism,	 brutal	 violations	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 in-
dividuals	 and	of	 ethnic	 and	confessional	 groups,	 slavery,	use	of	
weapons	of	mass	destruction,	etc.).	Islamic	State	thus	poses	a	seri-
ous	threat,	both	current	and	prospective,	to	its	surrounding	areas	
and	selected	locations	globally,	especially	in	the	West.	The	estab-
lishment	of	a	coalition	against	Islamic	State,	which	now	includes	
several	dozen	states	under	US	leadership	and	has	NATO’s	political	
support,	is	a	sign	of	the	de facto	recognition	and	validation	of	Is-
lamic	State’s	achievements;	and	the	fact	that	Islamic	State	contin-
ues	to	exist	despite	the	coalition’s	efforts	shows	the	seriousness	of	
the	situation	co-created	by	the	caliphate.
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ii. thE middlE East in thE shadow 
of islamic statE
Islamic	 State’s	 expansion	 in	 2014	 gained	 global	 notice,	 focused	
the	attention	of	the	media,	experts	and	politicians,	and	started	to	
be	seen	as	the	central	challenge	in	the	present-day	Middle	East.	
However,	any	analysis	of	IS	needs	to	take	into	account	the	region-
al	context,	without	which	it	will	be	impossible	to	understand	the	
essence	of	the	problem	and	its	consequences.	First	of	all,	Islamic	
State	is	a	consequence	of	the	Middle	East’s	problems,	rather	than	
their	main	cause.	Secondly,	Islamic	State	is	a	phenomenon	that	is	
at	the	same	time	exceptional	and	yet	very	typical	for	the	region.	
And	finally,	 the	 focus	on	 Islamic	State	 seems	 to	have	overshad-
owed	much	broader	and	more	serious	problems	which	are	inde-
pendent	from,	or	parallel	to	the	IS.
The	emergence	of	 Islamic	State	 is	a	symptom	of	a	deep	crisis	 in	
the	regional	political	order,	comparable	at	least	to	the	collapse	of	
the	Ottoman	Empire	or	the	period	of	decolonisation.	At	the	same	
time	it	is	a	social	crisis	and	a	crisis	for	the	Middle	East’s	security	
architecture,	and	it	has	been	engendering	deep	revaluation	and	
growing	conflicts.
1. Islamic State – an exception, or a typical problem?
1.1. The	Middle	East	at	war
Islamic	State	started	its	war	in	Syria	and	Iraq,	hoping	that	it	could	
expand	 into	 other	 countries.	 That	war	 has	 been	 brutal,	 involv-
ing	huge	forces	and	means,	and	has	been	dangerous	for	the	out-
side	world,	meaning	that	it	must	not	be	taken	lightly.	However,	it	
should	also	be	remembered	that	war	has	been	the	reality	in	Syria	
and	Iraq	for	years,10	and	Islamic	State’s	development	and	advances	
10	 It	should	be	noted	that	while	Iraq	and	Syria	stand	out	in	terms	of	the	scale	
of	war	and	the	attention	that	politicians	and	global	media	have	been	paying	
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are	a	direct	consequence	of	the	conflicts	that	have	long	been	di-
viding	the	region.
Iraq	has	been	involved	in	numerous	conflicts,	with	hardly	any	res-
pite,	at	least	since	1980.	The	first	was	the	brutal	war	with	Iran	(and	
the	Kurds),	which	 involved	 the	use	 of	 chemical	weapons	 against	
troops	and	civilians,	and	ended	in	1988.	This	was	followed	by	the	in-
vasion	of	Kuwait	(1990),	the	war	with	the	Arab	coalition,	the	United	
States,	the	Kurds	and	Shia	Muslims	(1991);	the	blockade	(combined	
with	periodic	attacks)	by	the	coalition	forces	in	the	following	years,	
and	 finally,	 the	 invasion	 by	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 coalition	
(2003),	followed	by	a	conflict	that	was	in	effect	a	civil	war	involv-
ing	post-Saddam,	Sunni	and	Shia	formations,	the	United	States	and	
the	coalition	forces.	Since	2003	alone,	between	135,000	and	155,000	
people	have	reportedly	been	killed	in	acts	of	violence	in	Iraq,11	and	
in	2007	it	was	estimated	that	around	2	million	people	had	fled	the	
country,	 and	 another	 2	million	 had	 become	 internally	 displaced	
(with	the	total	population	estimated	at	32.5	million	in	2014).
The	situation	in	Syria	is	similar.	The	country	had	been	in	a	frozen	
conflict	with	Israel	and	had	been	playing	a	key	role	in	the	Lebanese	
conflict	before	it	found	itself	in	a	state	of	civil	war	in	spring	2011.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 brutal	 conflict	 involving	 ethnic	 and	 religious	
cleansing,	mass	 human	 rights	 violations	 and	 the	 use	 of	 chemi-
cal	weapons,	among	other	means,	at	least	215,000	people	had	re-
portedly	been	killed	by	March	2015	(civilians	accounting	for	more	
than	half	of	this	number);	the	number	of	registered	refugees	has	
reached	4	million,	and	the	number	of	internally	displaced	persons	
to	it,	internal	armed	conflicts	are	a	common	occurrence	in	the	Middle	East.	
In	the	last	decade	alone,	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict	has	been	a	perma-
nent	phenomenon,	to	varying	degrees	of	intensity,	and	has	been	accompa-
nied	 by	 Israel’s	military	 operations	 in	 Lebanon	 and	 Syria;	 Iran	 has	 been	
facing	the	threat	of	US	or	Israeli	strikes;	civil	wars	have	been	taking	place	
in	Yemen	and	Libya;	Turkish-Kurdish	fighting	has	been	recurrent;	and	ten-
sions	have	accompanied	the	Arab	Spring	in	every	Arab	state	since	the	end	of	
2010	(including	actual	or	attempted	coups	and	revolutions).	
11	 https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/	accessed	on	28	March	2015.
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is	probably	much	higher	(with	the	total	population	estimated	at	
18	million	in	2014).
Islamic	State	has	grown	out	of	these	conflicts,	and	its	role	in	them	
has	been	expanding,	but	certainly	it	has	not	been	their	underly-
ing	cause,	nor	the	main	actor,	and	evidently	it	should	not	be	ex-
pected	that	IS	can	provide	any	solution.
1.2. Terrorism
Islamic	State	today	is	undoubtedly	a	powerful	terror	force,	which	
has	accumulated	the	experience	of	many	years	of	terror	activity	
and	–	compared	to	other	organisations	–	operates	on	the	frontline	
of	its	struggle.	However,	it	is	neither	the	first	nor	the	only	Islamic	
terror	organisation.	The	Middle	East	has	been	the	world’s	most	vi-
brant	centre	of	terrorism	over	the	last	century.	Irrespective	of	the	
differences	that	could	be	observed	over	time	and	space	in	terms	
of	the	underlying	ideologies	(ranging	from	Arab	and	Israeli	secu-
lar	anticolonial	and	independence	movements	to	radical	Muslim	
movements),	tactics	(individual,	collective	or	political	terrorism),	
the	phenomenon	has	been	permanent	in	the	Middle	East.	In	re-
cent	 years,	 Islamic	 terrorism	 has	 been	 the	 greatest	 challenge.	
In	 the	case	of	Sunni	 Islam,	 this	 refers	 to	 the	organisations	 that	
subscribe	 to	 the	ninety-year-old	 tradition	of	 the	Muslim	Broth-
erhood	 and	 the	 movements	 in	 al-Qaeda’s	 orbit.	 However,	 Shia	
terrorism	with	links	to	Iran	has	also	unexpectedly	emerged	and	
consolidated	in	the	region:	Hezbollah	from	Lebanon	is	the	perfect	
example,	and	the	movement	has	been	expanding	its	base	in	Iraq,	
Syria	and	Yemen.	The	Middle	East	has	invariably	been	the	main	
ideological,	social	and	financial	centre	of	terrorism,	and	has	re-
placed	Afghanistan	as	the	main	front	and	the	main	platform	for	
the	exchange	of	jihadi	experience	in	the	aftermath	of	the	war	in	
Syria	and	Iraq.	Bearing	in	mind	that	decades	of	struggle	against	
terrorism	in	the	Middle	East	by	various	actors	have	been	futile,	
it	is	doubtful	whether	solving	the	problem	posed	by	Islamic	State	
would	radically	alleviate	the	threat	of	terrorism.
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2. The crisis of the state and the emergence of new actors
Islamic	State	poses	an	open	challenge	to	the	regional	political	or-
der.	It	defies:
	– the	existing	regimes	in	power	in	the	Middle	East;
	– the	permanency	of	the	existing	borders;
	– the	concept	of	nations	as	sovereign	states;
	– Western	influence,	which	has	defined	the	historical	origins	of	
the	region’s	current	shape,	and	more	recently	has	been	a	way	
for	the	West	to	defend	and	consolidate	its	interests;
	– the	 role	of	 the	West	as	a	 civilisational	point	of	 reference	 for	
the	elites	and	societies	of	the	region,	without	any	permissible	
alternatives.
Islamic	 State	 has	 proposed	 an	 alternative	 concept	 of	 social	 and	
political	organisation:	a	state	based	on	Islam	as	a	legal	and	ideo-
logical	foundation	and	the	main	element	of	identity.	This	is	clear	
proof	of	the	crisis	of	the	state	as	we	know	it	(especially	the	Syrian	
and	Iraqi	states),	its	implosion	and	growing	dysfunction.	Howev-
er,	this	is	not	the	first	nor	the	only	occurrence	of	the	problem	in	
the	Middle	East;	the	question	of	states’	cohesion,	their	failure	to	
meet	 the	obvious	criteria	of	 statehood	 from	the	European	point	
of	view	(i.e.	exercising	sovereignty	over	their	territory	and	con-
trolling	their	borders),	and	the	inadequacy	of	the	formal	status	to	
the	actual	conditions	–	all	these	problems	have	become	the	Middle	
Eastern	norm.
The	 official	 authorities	 in	 Syria	 and	 Iraq	 control	 no	 more	 than	
a	third	of	their	respective	territories,	which	to	a	great	extent	is	the	
result	of	many	years	of	armed	conflicts	and	 the	political	disinte-
gration	of	the	state	(cf.	the	Kurdish	Regional	Government	in	Iraq).	
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The	situation	is	similar	in	Lebanon,	where	the	Hezbollah	statelet	
has	gained	de facto	independence,	and	in	Egypt’s	Sinai	Peninsula,	
which	is	only	nominally	controlled	by	the	military.12	Likewise,	the	
situation	 of	 Israel	 has	 remained	 in	 suspension	 for	 decades,	with	
the	Israeli	state	controlling	the	Golan	Heights,	to	various	degrees	
the	West	Bank	and	the	Gaza	Strip,	and	with	the	process	to	formally	
resolve	 these	problems	continually	 stalling.	The	degree	 to	which	
the	individual	states	control	their	borders	is	highly	disputable,	and	
the	problem	is	exacerbated	by	geographic	conditions	(mountains,	
deserts),	cultural	 issues	(communities	split	by	state	borders),	and	
even	more	importantly,	the	conflicts	within	and	the	weakness	of	
the	state	apparatuses.	It	is	notable	that	this	inability	to	effectively	
control	borders	affects	even	well-established	states	such	as	Israel	
(the	border	with	Sinai),	Turkey	(borders	with	Iran,	Iraq	and	Syria)	
and	Iran	(almost	all	its	borders	to	varying	degrees).
As	a	consequence	of	the	weakness	of	the	states,	an	alternative	po-
litical	map	of	the	region	has	been	emerging,	and	new	organisms	
have	been	formed	with	some	of	the	important	hallmarks	of	con-
temporary	 independent	 states,	 including	 consolidated	 political	
decision-making	centres,	institutions	replacing	state	bodies	(e.g.	
local	 administrations),	 integrated	 communities,	 armed	 forces,	
and	 independently	 conducted	 foreign	 and	 internal	 policies.	 In	
most	cases,	their	overtly	declared	objective	is	to	gain	formal	in-
dependence,	 the	absence	of	which	 is	often	 the	only	 reason	why	
such	entities	are	not	recognised	as	sovereign.	Islamic	State	is	also	
a	 para-state	 entity	 of	 this	 kind.	 The	 Kurdish	 Regional	 Govern-
ment	 in	 Iraq	 is	another	such,	 to	at	 least	 the	same	degree:	 it	has	
been	 institutionalised	 since	 1991,	 is	 internally	 sovereign,	 con-
ducts	an	active	 foreign	policy	and	serves	as	an	 important	point	
of	reference	for	Kurds	outside	Iraq	(especially	in	Syria,	where	the	
Kurdish	community	has	been	consolidating	its	own	autonomy	in	
12	 And	 further	 away	 from	 the	 direct	 neighbourhood	 of	 Syria	 and	 Iraq,	 this	
problem	also	applies	to	the	disintegrated	and	war-torn	Yemen,	Libya,	and	
the	desert	and	mountain	areas	in	North	Africa.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
15
22
the	conditions	of	 the	war).	Other	para-state	entities	 include	 the	
Hezbollah-controlled	 territory	 in	 Lebanon,	 the	 Gaza	 Strip,	 and	
especially	the	Palestinian	Authority	 in	the	West	Bank	(which	is	
the	most	advanced	in	gaining	international	recognition).	Autono-
mous	and	separatist	 tendencies	are	also	present	either	directly,	
for	 instance	 in	 Iraq	 (the	 Basra	 autonomy),	 or	 indirectly,	 e.g.	 in	
Saudi	Arabia	(the	eastern	al-Ahsa	province),	and	most	important-
ly	 in	Turkey	 itself	 (the	Turkish	Kurds’	 long	 armed	and	political	
struggle	 for	 autonomy/independence,	 and	 the	 structures	 of	 the	
underground	Kurdish	state).
Another	problem,	which	cannot	be	neatly	separated	from	the	col-
lapse	of	 states	and	 the	separatist	 tendencies,	 concerns	so-called	
black	holes,	usually	small	areas	in	which	official	authority	has	de 
facto	disappeared,	replaced	by	informal	criminal	or	terror	struc-
tures,	or	reactivated	traditional	(e.g.	tribal)	forms	of	social	organ-
isation.	A	black	hole	is	typically	the	area	or	hinterland	of	a	politi-
cal	conflict,	and	the	conflict	is	often	its	point	of	reference,	but	in	
practice	the	forces	in	power	in	black	holes	do	not	aspire	to	politi-
cal	independence,	and	are	not	capable	of	creating	alternative	state	
structures.	The	Sunni	triangle	in	Iraq	was	an	example	of	a	black	
hole	 (and	also	 a	perfect	breeding	ground	 for	what	 later	became	
Islamic	State).	Today	large	areas	in	Iraq	and	Syria	certainly	meet	
the	definition	of	black	holes,	 including	both	 the	 territories	con-
trolled	by	the	numerous	anti-regime	terror	groups,	and	the	areas	
that	formally	recognise	the	government	in	Damascus	but	in	prac-
tice	are	controlled	by	local	Alawi	militias.
The	 problem	 of	 the	 implosion	 of	 states	 and	 the	 erosion	 of	 their	
structures	and	legal	order	 is	 the	underlying	cause	and,	starting	
from	a	certain	point,	also	the	consequence,	of	the	emergence	and	
consolidation	of	new	political	 forces	which	either	do	not	fit	 into	
the	 constitutional	 order	 or	 openly	 challenge	 that	 order.	 Those	
forces	 include	 terror	 organisations	 ranging	 from	 Islamic	 State	
to	the	al-Qaeda-affiliated	Jabhat	al-Nusra,	its	main	rival	in	Syria,	
or	Hamas,	to	name	just	those	groupings	which	play	a	key	role	in	
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the	 territories	 in	 which	 they	 operate.	 There	 are	 also	 organisa-
tions	(often	also	terrorist	in	nature)	that	stem	from	confessional	
groups,	 such	 as	 the	 Shia	 Hezbollah	 in	 Lebanon,	 the	 Zaidi/Shia	
Houthi	movement	in	Yemen,	and	finally,	at	least	a	dozen	Shia	mi-
litias	in	Iraq.	Meanwhile,	groups	built	on	ethnic	foundations	have	
not	disappeared	entirely	(in	particular	the	Kurds).	In	many	cases,	
groups	of	this	kind	have	been	used	by	the	nominal	state	authori-
ties	as	additional	armed	forces	parallel	to	the	army	and	deployed	
in	military	operations:	cf.	the	case	of	Syria,	and	the	Shabiha	Alawi	
militias	operating	under	the	umbrella	of	the	ruling	Ba’ath	party;	
or	Iraq,	where	the	Shia	militias,	alongside	the	Kurdish	Peshmerga,	
have	been	the	main	force	in	Baghdad’s	counteroffensives	against	
Islamic	State.	It	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	situation	that	these	
non-state	 forces	de facto	 conduct	 their	own	international	activi-
ties	 (expanding	beyond	 the	 regional	 level),	 that	 is,	 they	 receive	
foreign	volunteers,	money	and	weapons,	in	some	cases	maintain	
official	bureaus	abroad,	and	are	themselves	the	addressees	of	oth-
er	players’	foreign	policy	(as	in	the	special	case	of	the	Iraqi	Kurds).
3. The Middle East – collapse of the system?
The	Middle	East’s	problems	associated	with	Islamic	State	may	be	
seen	either	as	a	stability	deficit	issue,	generating	local	disturbanc-
es	and	 typical	 for	 the	 region;	or	more	broadly,	 as	 a	 symptom	of	
a	deeper	crisis,	or	even	the	collapse	of	the	entire	regional	order.	
The	latter	perspective	seems	to	be	gaining	prominence	both	in	the	
region	and	in	the	West.
According	to	the	latter	point	of	view,	the	Middle	Eastern	order	is	
the	result	of	Western	dominance,	which	culminated	in	the	disman-
tling	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	the	aftermath	of	World	War	I	(1918)	
and	the	creation	of	new	states	more	or	 less	modelled	on	Western	
social	and	political	solutions	(including	the	nation-state	model).
Irrespective	of	 the	region’s	rich	history,	 the	contemporary	Arab	
states	in	the	Middle	East	were	first	given	their	present	shape	and	
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formal	 independence	only	 in	 the	 1930s	 (e.g.	 Iraq,	Saudi	Arabia),	
1940s	 (e.g.	Syria,	 Jordan	or	 Israel),	or	even	 the	 1970s	 (some	Gulf	
states).	Given	their	huge	internal	dynamics,	this	means	that	they	
still	have	not	become	fully	consolidated.
Western	 dominance	 (in	 recent	 decades,	 US	 dominance)	 in	 the	
civilisational,	political	and	military	dimension	has	been	the	key	
aspect	of	this	model.13	Currently	it	has	been	experiencing	a	deep	
crisis,	or	might	even	be	close	to	reaching	the	limits	of	its	potential.	
Interestingly,	the	view	that	the	situation	at	hand	is	about	the	col-
lapse	of	the	post-colonial	order	is	shared	by	Islamic	State,	Iran	and	
Turkey,	despite	all	their	differences.
3.1. Internal	dimension	of	the	crisis
A	number	of	hypotheses	have	been	formulated	about	the	funda-
mental	 nature	 of	 the	 crisis.	 One	 of	 them	 concerns	 the	 eroding	
legitimacy	of	 governments,	which	 are	 corrupt,	 built	 on	narrow	
and	 closed	 elites	 (the	military,	 the	 security	 apparatus,	 in	 some	
cases	royal	families),	and	incapable	of	creating	effective	institu-
tions,	modernising	the	state	or	solving	social	problems.	The	Arab	
Spring,	the	wave	of	protests	that	broke	out	throughout	the	Arab	
world	demanding	reforms,	improvement	of	living	standards	and	
the	political	situation,	can	 in	this	context	be	seen	as	an	expres-
sion	of	this	kind	of	frustration.	The	response	to	the	Arab	Spring	
was	based	on	force	in	most	cases:	the	protests	were	suppressed,	or	
morphed	into	civil	wars.	However,	the	hypothesis	about	the	erod-
ing	legitimacy	of	the	governments	remains	valid.
A	more	serious	question	concerns	ongoing	revaluations	of	 iden-
tity.	The	plans	to	build	modern	states	in	the	region	were	based	on	
the	assumption	that	modern	nations	would	exist,	or	be	created,	
13	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 even	 the	USSR	promoted	Western	values,	 such	as	
social	and	economic	modernisation,	secular	state,	armies,	etc.,	during	the	
Cold	War.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
15
25
to	legitimise	(in	any	way	possible)	both	the	governments	and	the	
states	themselves.	The	present	condition	of	Iraq	and	Syria,	which	
for	decades	used	to	be	counted	among	the	most	socially	and	po-
litically	 developed	 Arab	 states,	 shows	 that	 states	 as	 such	 have	
decomposed,	 and	 the	 prospects	 of	 restoring	 their	 functionality	
based	on	the	original	institutions,	and	reintegrating	them	within	
their	original	borders,	are	extremely	vague.
Worse,	 one	 could	 call	 into	 question	 the	 resilience,	 or	 even	 the	
very	existence,	of	the	Iraqi	or	Syrian	nations	as	political	subjects,	
the	supreme	category	ordering	the	two	countries’	political	real-
ity.	Confessional	and	ethnic	divisions,	and	the	political	divisions	
founded	on	them,	seem	to	have	ultimately	undermined	the	notion	
of	political	nations	in	the	cases	of	Iraq	and	Syria.
To	 varying	 degrees,	 this	 question	 also	 applies	 to	 other	 states/
nations	of	 the	region,	for	 instance	the	Palestinians	(in	the	West	
Bank,	the	Gaza	Strip,	Israel	and	Jordan)	or	the	Saudis	(who	define	
themselves	as	subjects	of	the	Saud	dynasty).	For	the	critics	of	the	
Middle	Eastern	order,	 this	proves	 that	while	 local,	 confessional	
and	possibly	ethnic	identities	remain	strong,	the	nation,	especial-
ly	as	a	political	entity,	is	an	artificial	category.14
Religion,	on	the	other	hand,	seems	to	offer	a	tempting	alternative	
to	the	notion	of	nationality	–	with	Islam	as	a	universalising	cat-
egory	(albeit	subdivided	along	confessional	lines).	The	position	of	
Islam	as	one	of	the	key	components	of	identity	is	entrenched	in	the	
region	and	deeply	rooted	in	its	history	and	culture,	and	it	also	of-
fers	a	strong	mandate	for	political	activity.	Islam	has	been,	and	is	
still	seen	as	the	foundation	of	movements	challenging	the	colonial	
14	 The	Kurds	are	an	exception	from	this	rule,	as	their	Kurdish	national	iden-
tity	and	ambitions	to	establish	a	modern	nation	state	have	not	been	eroding,	
but	on	the	contrary,	are	on	the	rise.	Naturally,	 Israel,	 too,	remains	a	 fun-
damental	exception	from	the	rule,	as	it	is	engaged	in	a	mounting	debate	on	
strengthening	the	ethnic	component	of	its	identity,	i.e.	transforming	Israel	
into	a	‘Jewish	state’.
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and	post-colonial	order	in	the	region	(with	fundamentalist	move-
ments	originating	either	from	the	tradition	of	the	Sunni	Muslim	
Brotherhood,	or	Khomeini’s	Shia	revolution).	The	Salafi	current	
in	 Islam	today	 is	probably	 the	strongest	movement	of	both	reli-
gious	and	spiritual,	as	well	as	moral	and	social	revival,	in	which	
social	 justice	 is	 an	 important	 element.	 Finally,	 Islam	 is	 a	 very	
spacious	 category,	 and	 is	 remarkably	open	 to	 interpretations:	 it	
can	be	at	 the	same	time	 the	 foundation	of	radical	anti-systemic	
movements	such	as	Islamic	State,	the	pillar	of	conservative	rule	in	
Saudi	Arabia,	Iran’s	theocratic	system	as	introduced	36	years	ago,	
and	 an	 important	 component	 of	 Turkey’s	 modernisation	 under	
the	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP).	Finally,	Islam	and	all	its	
divisions	seems	to	offer	a	key	to	the	present-day	conflicts	in	the	
Middle	East:	it	is	a	commonly	held,	and	not	necessarily	unfound-
ed,	belief	that	all	these	conflicts	fit	the	blueprint	of	the	Sunni-Shia	
rivalry	which	overarches	any	local	specificities	and	exceptions.
The	presumed	identity	and	ideational	revaluations	and	conflicts	
are	not	 the	only	reason	why	 the	categories	which	used	 to	order	
Middle	Eastern	 realities	 (including	 state	 and	nation)	have	been	
eroding.	Demographic	and	social	issues	also	play	a	significant	role	
here.	This	refers	in	particular	to	demographic	pressures15	and	mi-
grations	caused	by	conflicts,16	which	have	considerably	changed	
the	traditional	societies	and	are	inevitably	engendering	cultural	
(and	political)	change.17
15	 For	instance,	if	one	takes	Iraq	and	Syria	and	all	their	neighbouring	coun-
tries,	in	all	of	them	people	under	25	years	account	for	more	than	40%	of	the	
population	(around	53%	in	Syria,	and	around	56%	of	the	population	in	Iraq	
and	Jordan).	Figures	from	the	CIA	World	Factbook.
16	 It	is	estimated	that	around	20%	of	the	population	of	Iraq	and	at	least	40%	of	
the	population	in	Syria	have	been	forced	to	permanently	leave	their	homes.	
As	regards	the	migrations	of	non-Muslim	minorities	(especially	Christians),	
their	return	is	out	of	the	question,	and	these	communities	are	inevitably	set	
to	disappear	from	Iraq	and	Syria.
17	 On	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 area	 under	 consideration	 here,	 the	 Arab	 Gulf	
states	are	experiencing	another	problem	that	stimulates	identity,	social	
and	 cultural	 problems,	 i.e.	 the	high	numbers	 of	working	migrants	 liv-
ing	there,	who	account	for	30–40%	of	the	population	(in	the	United	Arab	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
15
27
3.2. International	dimension	of	the	crisis
While	the	Middle	East	has	long	been	considered	to	be	an	unstable	
region	torn	by	tensions	and	conflicts	within	and	between	states,	
it	used	to	have	some	‘checks	and	balances’	to	prevent	the	problems	
from	escalating	out	of	control.	Those	checks	and	balances	includ-
ed	the	principles	of	territorial	integrity	and	strategic	equilibrium	
between	 states,	which	were	 guaranteed	 and	 enforced	 since	 the	
end	of	the	Cold	War	by	the	United	States	supported	by	local	allies,	
partners	and	clients.
Examples	of	how	this	system	worked	included:
	– the	freezing	of	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict;
	– the	resolution	of	Israel’s	conflict	with	Egypt	and	Jordan;
	– the	existence	and	co-ordination	of	a	block	of	states	to	contain	
Iran	after	the	Islamic	revolution	of	1979;
	– the	war	with	Iraq	following	its	annexation	of	Kuwait;
	– the	combatting	of	al-Qaeda;
	– the	 attempt	 at	 comprehensively	 solving	 the	 problems	 with	
Iraq	(after	2003).
The	system	worked	better	or	worse	until	around	2011,	when	the	
United	States	symbolically	stepped	down	from	its	role	as	the	guar-
antor	and	regulator	of	stability	in	the	Middle	East.	In	late	2011	the	
operation	 in	 Iraq	ended	and	the	US	forces	were	evacuated	 from	
the	country;	the	Arab	Spring	broke	out,	towards	which	the	United	
States	adopted	a	very	reserved	attitude;	and	finally,	the	US	turned	
Emirates	and	Qatar,	local	inhabitants	account	for	just	over	ten	percent	of	
the	total	population).
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out	to	be	helpless	in	the	face	of	the	civil	war	in	Syria	(it	failed	to	
deliver	on	its	warnings	to	Damascus	after	the	regime	used	chemi-
cal	weapons)	and	Iran’s	nuclear	programme.
In	view	of	the	huge	and	growing	scale	of	problems	in	the	Middle	
East,	the	stance	adopted	by	the	US	administration	has	led	to	the	
disintegration	of	the	network	of	‘allies’	in	the	region,	and	created	
the	 impression	of	a	vacuum,	which	other	players,	 ranging	 from	
regional	powers	to	actors	such	as	Islamic	State,	motivated	either	
by	fear	or	by	hope,	have	started	to	fill	at	the	expense	of	overall	sta-
bility,	thus	decisively	contributing	to	the	further	destabilisation	
and	disintegration	of	the	regional	order.
Describing	 the	 current	 conflicts	 in	 Syria	 and	 Iraq	 as	 ‘the	 civil	
war	in	Syria’	or	‘the	war	on	Islamic	State’	seems	to	be	the	sign	of	
a	possibly	deliberate	failure	to	notice	the	fact	that	the	region	was	
actually	already	in	a	state	of	war,	or	at	least	a	proxy	war.18	The	de-
velopment	of	the	situation	crucially	depends	on	the	involvement	
of	 individual	 states	 in	 supporting	 (and	creating)	 the	 forces	 that	
take	part	in	the	conflict.	The	government	in	Damascus	has	been	
receiving	political,	financial	and	logistic	support,	as	well	as	peo-
ple	and	equipment,	from	Iran	and	the	Lebanese	Hezbollah	(as	well	
as	 Russia).	 The	 Syrian	 opposition,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 built	
up	its	structures	on	the	territory	of	Turkey	(e.g.	the	Free	Syrian	
Army)	with	the	support	of	Arab	and	Western	states,	and	its	po-
litical	leadership	has	benefited	from	the	hospitality	of	Turkey	and	
Qatar;	and	finally,	the	Islamist	organisations	have	received	broad	
support	 from	 Arab	 states	 and	 independent	 communities.	 Like-
wise,	the	Iraqi	government	in	Baghdad	has	survived	thanks	to	the	
political	and	military	support	provided	by	Iran	and	the	coalition	
(including	the	USA);	the	Iraqi	Kurds	have	received	various	forms	
of	support	from	the	United	States,	Western	countries,	Turkey	and	
18	 The	problem	is	not	 limited	to	the	recent	conflicts	 in	Syria	and	Iraq;	 it	has	
been	at	least	as	pronounced	in	the	Yemeni	conflict	(especially	considering	
its	escalation	in	March	2015).
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Iran;	and	Iran	itself	is	believed	to	have	created	and	given	patron-
age	to	more	than	a	dozen	Shia	militias,	while	the	Sunni	opposition	
groups	in	the	period	preceding	Islamic	State’s	offensive	were	sup-
ported	by	Saudi	Arabia	and	the	Gulf	states.	 In	addition	to	 those	
indirect	 activities,	 direct	military	 operations	 have	 been	 taking	
place	in	the	region,	involving	the	Iranian	forces	in	Iraq	and	Syria	
(land	troops	and	air	forces),	forces	of	the	Arab	states	(air	strikes	
against	the	Islamic	State),	and	US	troops	and	forces	of	other	West-
ern	states	(air	strikes	against	the	IS).	 In	addition,	 the	Israeli	air	
force	has	repeatedly	bombed	targets	in	Syria,	and	Turkey’s	(hith-
erto	solely	rhetorical)	threats	to	intervene	in	Syria	have	by	now	
become	a	permanent	element	of	the	landscape	(and	incidents	in-
volving	the	air	force	and	artillery	have	taken	place	on	a	number	of	
occasions);	while	in	the	Kurdish	context,	Turkey	has	maintained	
a	permanent	military	presence	 in	 the	Kurdish	regional	govern-
ment	 area	 in	 Iraq,	 and	 has	 carried	 out	 operations	 against	 the	
Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	in	Iraq).
The	 present	 situation	 is	 notable	 for	 its	 opaqueness	 and	 the	 ab-
sence	of	a	single	key	to	its	interpretation.	Undoubtedly,	the	con-
flict	between	Iran	and	nearly	all	the	states	of	the	region	has	been	
and	remains	a	key	issue	(since	1979).	 Iran	has	been	consistently	
working	 to	undermine	 the	 regional	 order	 founded	 on	US	 influ-
ence	since	Khomeini’s	revolution,	and	has	pursued	an	expansive	
policy	 aimed	 at	 building	 its	 hegemony	 in	 the	 region,	 but	 at	 the	
same	time	it	has	been	constantly	surrounded	and	threatened	by	
the	USA	(as	well	as	Israel	and	Saudi	Arabia)	with	war,	economic	
sanctions,	or	the	prospect	of	a	coup.	In	this	context,	the	problems	
of	Syria	and	Iraq	seem	to	fit	into	the	blueprint	of	a	clash	between	
Iran’s	clients	and	the	clients	of	Iran’s	opponents.	However,	while	
the	Iran	camp	can	be	arguably	described	as	cohesive	to	some	ex-
tent,	no	consolidated	anti-Iran	front	exists	today	(which	seems	to	
be	the	consequence	of	the	USA’s	withdrawal).	Tensions	are	huge,	
especially	between	Turkey	 and	 Israel,	 and	between	Turkey	 and	
the	Arab	states:	relations	are	frigid	at	best,	due	to	the	consistent	
support	Ankara	has	granted	to	groups	with	links	to	the	Muslim	
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Brotherhood	 (both	 in	Syria	 and	 in	Egypt),	 among	other	 factors;	
and	this	frigidity	is	visible	in	the	way	that	Ankara	has	been	dis-
tancing	itself	from	any	active	efforts	to	combat	Islamic	State.	Ten-
sions	also	persist	 among	 the	Arab	 states:	 they	all	 fear	 Iran,	but	
also	Turkey’s	regional	aspirations	and	the	hegemonic	ambitions	of	
Saudi	Arabia,	and	regard	different	forces	as	their	proxies.
As	a	result:
	– the	situation	in	the	region	is	extremely	difficult	to	interpret,	
which	makes	it	difficult	to	set	priorities;
	– the	 actors	 involved	 are	 suspicious	 of	 their	 obvious	 enemies,	
but	also	of	their	supposed	allies;	and	finally
	– they	 show	 a	 propensity	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 risky,	 short-term	
games	in	relation	to	the	conflicts.
The	proliferation	of	conspiracy	theories	about	the	sources	of	 Is-
lamic	State’s	success	are	a	good	illustration	of	this	state	of	affairs,	
i.e.	the	ongoing	proxy	war,	the	opaqueness,	the	dynamics	and	the	
lack	of	confidence	in	the	region	(at	the	same	time,	they	have	also	
played	an	important	role	in	contributing	to	IS’s	success).19	Accord-
ing	to	those	theories,	Islamic	State	is	alternately:
a)	 a	project	inspired	and	supported	by	Saudi	Arabia,	aimed	against	
Iran	and	its	clients,	i.e.	the	Assad	regime	and	the	Iraqi	Shias;
19	 Even	the	‘official’	history	of	Islamic	State,	as	presented	in	most	studies	on	IS	
published	in	the	West,	shows	that	these	various	calculations	and	circum-
stances	 intersected:	 the	group	 surrounding	 the	 Jordanian	al-Zarqawi	 en-
tered	into	the	orbit	of	Osama	bin	Laden,	with	his	numerous	links	to	Saudi	
Arabia	(and	previous	indirect	links	to	the	United	States);	also,	al-Zarqawi’s	
transfer	to	Iraq	took	place	via	Iran,	certainly	with	the	approval	of	the	Ira-
nian	security	 forces	 (and	was	an	act	of	 sabotage	aimed	at	 supposed	plans	
to	attack	 Iran).	During	 the	Syrian	war,	 Islamic	State	has	been	among	 the	
regime’s	most	active	opponents,	and	has	mainly	attracted	Arab	volunteers	
who	arrive	via	Turkey.	
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b)	 a	project	conceived	by	Israel	and	the	United	States	in	order	to	
destabilise	the	Middle	East	and	manage	the	subsequent	con-
flict,	in	the	absence	of	other	instruments	to	control	the	region	
(the	alleged	evidence	of	this	includes	reports	that	IS	militants	
have	received	medical	treatment	in	Israel);
c)	 a	Turkish	project,	designed	as	kind	of	battering	ram	to	destroy	
the	Syrian	and	Iraqi	states	and	Iranian	influence,	counterbal-
ance	the	Kurds	and	clear	the	field	for	Turkish	expansion	(this	
theory	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 substantiated	 by	 the	 relative	 free-
dom	granted	to	Islamic	State	to	operate	on	Turkish	territory,	
as	well	as	reports	that	Turkey	has	allegedly	provided	medical	
treatment	to	IS	militants	and	let	them	use	its	territory	in	the	
operation	against	Kobane;	has	been	tolerating	IS-led	oil	smug-
gling,	a	key	source	of	its	revenues;	and	that	Turkish	security	
forces	have	very	good	contacts	with	IS,	thanks	to	which	they	
have	been	able	to	negotiate	the	release	of	the	Turkish	hostages	
held	by	IS	in	Iraq,	etc.);
d)	 an	 Iranian	project	designed	 to	undermine	Sunni	unity	and	
frighten	the	Kurds	and	Iraq’s	Shias	so	that	they	turn	to	Iran;	
proponents	of	this	theory	emphasise	how	easily	the	Shia	Ira-
qi	army	‘ceded’	its	territory	and	weapons	to	Islamic	State	in	
June	2014;
e)	 a	Russian	project	–	this	theory	refers	to	the	anti-American	as-
pect	of	Islamic	State’s	activities,	and	the	presence	of	a	large	and	
influential	group	of	militants	from	the	Russian	Federation	and	
the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States,	which	is	presumed	
to	have	been	infiltrated	by	the	Russian	security	services.
This	 list	 is	 far	 from	 complete,	 and	 these	 theories	 lack	 internal	
cohesion	and	are	poorly	substantiated,	but	what	they	all	have	in	
common	is	that	they	question	the	self-made	nature	and	autono-
my	of	Islamic	State,	de facto	play	down	the	threat	it	poses,	and	see	
its	activities	through	the	lens	of	the	alleged	hostile	designs	of	the	
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regional	 rivals,	 and/or	 those	rivals’	 losses	or	ad hoc	 gains	 stem-
ming	from	Islamic	State’s	existence.	Clearly,	there	is	also	a	funda-
mental	difference	between	the	way	the	West	and	its	politicians,	
media	and	experts	see	Islamic	State	and	the	problems	in	the	Mid-
dle	East,	and	the	views	and	perceptions	of	the	states	in	the	region	
and	their	politicians,	media	outlets,	experts	and	the	wide	public;	
this	difference	also	seems	to	be	a	major	problem.
3.3. A	regional	alternative
The	 sense	 that	 the	Middle	Eastern	order	 is	 collapsing,	 and	 that	
a	vacuum	has	been	created	by	US	policy,	has	not	only	open	oppor-
tunities	for	forces	such	as	Islamic	State,	but	has	also	intersected	
with	the	ambitions	of	the	new-old	regional	powers,	Iran	and	Tur-
key,	both	of	which	are	actively	involved	in	the	region’s	proxy	war.
Apart	 from	 their	 pragmatic	will	 to	 influence	 the	 unstable	 sur-
rounding	area,	and	fill	the	vacuum	left	by	the	United	States	as	its	
position	 in	 the	Middle	East	erodes,	another	crucially	 important	
motivation	in	this	respect	comes	from	the	reassessments	taking	
place	 in	both	 countries,	which	constitute	 a	positive	 response	 to	
the	region’s	general	problems.
Iran’s	ever	bolder	conviction	of	its	own	strength	largely	stems	from	
the	view	that	the	country	is	emerging	victorious	from	its	confronta-
tion	of	more	than	thirty	years	with	the	United	States,	and	from	the	
belief	that	recognition	of	its	status	as	a	power	and	its	positive	role	
in	the	region	will	come	about	in	the	not	too	distant	future.	Also	im-
portant	is	the	conviction	that	its	policy	towards	Syria	and	Iraq	has	
been	gaining	significance,	and	that	it	has	developed	an	effective	set	
of	instruments	which	have	proved	effective,	while	the	relative	po-
sition	of	Iran’s	potential	regional	rivals	has	been	eroding.	The	view	
that	Iran’s	position	in	the	Middle	East	today	(in	Syria,	Iraq,	Yemen,	
Lebanon)	is	the	strongest	it	has	been	in	centuries,	in	stark	contrast	
to	the	deeply	defensive	positions	in	which	Iran’s	rivals	have	found	
themselves,	is	an	opinion	held	not	just	by	Tehran	alone.
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In	the	case	of	Turkey,	its	ambitions	are	largely	based	on	the	sense	
of	 the	strength	of	 the	Turkish	state	and	economy,	and	on	 its	at-
tractiveness	to	the	neighbourhood.
In	both	 cases,	 identity	 transformations	have	also	played	an	 im-
portant	 role:	 both	 countries	 are	 increasingly	 emphasising	 and	
mythologising	their	former	imperial	and	civilisational	glory	and	
the	 continuity	 of	 their	 statehood,	 which	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	
their	neighbours	in	the	Middle	East.	Both	Turkey	and	Iran	have	
long	 been	 undergoing	 violent	 evolutions	 of	 identity,	 processes	
which	have	now	also	started	in	the	Arab	Middle	East.	In	the	case	
of	Iran,	these	began	with	decades	of	selective	modernisation	and	
nationalism	under	the	Pahlavi	Shah	dynasty,	followed	by	the	du-
rable	experiment	of	Islamic	democracy	(whereby	Islam	served	as	
the	axis	of	policy	for	internal	and	external	use),	and	leading	to	the	
policy	of	Iran’s	present-day	ruling	elite,	which	is	far	less	religious-
ly	 ideological	and	more	pragmatic	 from	the	 Iranian	 leadership’s	
point	of	view.	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	the	process	started	with	dec-
ades	of	 secular	and	extremely	nationalist	military	dictatorship,	
which	drew	its	inspirations	from	Western	models,	followed	by	the	
rise	to	power	of	the	AKP	in	2002	(when	none	of	the	parties	that	
had	previously	been	 in	parliament	won	any	 seats)	 and	 the	pro-
cess	of	social,	political	and	economic	modernisation	with	a	strong	
focus	on	 traditional,	 i.e.	 Islamic,	values	 and	 references	 to	Otto-
man	times.	In	both	cases	these	processes	have	generated	a	sense	
of	sovereignty	in	internal	policy,	and	have	been	a	manifestation	of	
spontaneously	initiated	internal	transformations	that	generated	
additional	political	and	social	energy.
In	the	conditions	of	the	Middle	East’s	present	crisis,	Iran	has	been	
trying	 to	build	up	an	 image	of	 itself	as	a	strong	state	capable	of	
providing	a	protective	umbrella	to	political	players	such	as	Bagh-
dad,	Damascus	or	the	Kurds,	the	Shias	from	the	Arab	Peninsula	
and	groups	endangered	by	the	Sunni	radicals.	Moreover,	Iran	of-
fers	a	positive	example	of	durable	social	development	and	relative	
social	security.	Turkey’s	ideational	offer	is	even	more	ambitious:	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
15
34
the	country	has	been	representing	itself	as	a	paragon	of	a	success-
ful	model	of	political,	social	and	–	most	 importantly	–	economic	
development,	bringing	 together	 the	best	aspects	of	 the	Western	
model	and	Turkey’s	own	tradition,	combining	the	achievements	
of	Western	modernisation	with	an	effective	adaptation	of	 Islam	
to	the	demands	of	modernity,	and	finally,	responding	to	the	chal-
lenges	of	nationhood	(by	mitigating	Turkish	nationalism	to	some	
extent	and	becoming	much	more	open	to	the	national	ambitions	
of	the	Kurds,	as	Turkey’s	relations	with	the	Kurdish	regional	gov-
ernment	in	Iraq	and	its	peace	process	with	the	PKK	arguably	dem-
onstrate).
Both	Iran	and	Turkey	are	convinced	that	their	own	assessments	of	
the	situation	and	their	strength	are	correct,	and	both	have	been	
remarkably	 consistent	 in	 implementing	 their	 policies,	 despite	
the	costs	and	risks	involved,	and	–	especially	in	the	case	of	Tur-
key	–	the	failure	of	the	policy	to	produce	any	tangible	benefits	in	
recent	years.	In	both	cases	it	would	be	more	justified	to	speak	of	
long-term,	strategic	policies	that	the	two	states	have	initiated,	and	
from	which	neither	Tehran	nor	Ankara	could	withdraw	without	
massive	disturbance,	especially	in	view	of	the	objective	challeng-
es	in	the	region	and	the	impossibility	of	restoring	the	former	or-
der.	In	both	cases	there	are	also	ever	stronger	linkages	between	
the	international	situation	and	the	internal	processes,	which	may	
stimulate	instability.	Although	for	the	moment,	Turkey	and	Iran	
seem	to	be	much	internally	consolidated	than	their	neighbours,	
identity	 problems	 and	 social	 tensions	 related	 inter alia	 to	 ques-
tions	about	democracy,	Islam,	nation	and	state	still	persist	in	both	
countries.	Both	are	also	affected	by	ethnic	and	religious	tensions,	
problems	with	 the	control	of	 territory	and	borders,	etc.	 In	both	
cases	(but	especially	in	Iran),	the	strength	and	credibility	of	the	
ruling	elite	rests	on	the	success	of	its	regional	policy.	At	this	stage,	
it	 now	 seems	 impossible	 for	 either	 Iran	 or	 Turkey	 to	withdraw	
from	the	proxy	war	–	they	still	have	a	long	way	to	go	to	fulfil	their	
huge	ambitions,	and	serious	risks	lie	ahead.
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iii. islamic statE and thE middlE EastErn 
crisis – an unsolvablE problEm?
There	is	a	fairly	common	understanding,	both	in	the	Middle	East	and	
worldwide,	that	Islamic	State	is	a	threat.	
Hence,	several	tens	of	states	under	US	leadership	have	formed	a	coa-
lition	against	it;	and	in	parallel,	Iran	and	its	satellites,	which	have	not	
joined	the	coalition,	have	been	actively	combatting	the	‘caliphate’.	For	
the	United	States	and	Western	countries,	being	in	that	alliance	is	pri-
marily	another	phase	of	the	war	on	terror	and	a	way	to	preserve	their	
prestige	in	the	Middle	East.	
The	Arab	states	are	motivated	mainly	by	concerns	about	their	own	
security	in	the	medium	and	long	term,	because	Islamic	State’s	suc-
cess	has	already	exposed	the	weakness	of	those	states’	regional	pol-
icy,	and	in	future	could	lead	to	the	emergence	of	a	real	alternative	
to	the	current	regimes	and	enable	actions	aimed	at	destabilising	the	
internal	situation	in	those	countries.	
For	 Iraq	 and	 the	 Kurds,	 Islamic	 State	 poses	 an	 existential	 threat,	
and	for	Syria	a	real	challenge	to	its	current	position,	while	for	Iran	
it	threatens	the	failure	of	its	much-considered	strategic	initiative	to	
combat	Sunni	radicals,	who	could	potentially	exploited	by	Tehran’s	
regional	opponents.	
Thus,	large-scale	air	strikes	against	IS	positions	are	underway,	and	
efforts	are	being	made	to	strengthen	IS’s	 local	opponents	(ranging	
from	the	Kurds	to	the	Iraqi	state	and	the	Shia	militias)	and	create	
a	counterbalance	for	the	radicals	in	Syria.	Active	negotiations	have	
been	going	on	to	co-ordinate	the	efforts	and	interests	of	all	the	states	
implicated	in	the	war.	
The	scale	of	difficulty	involved	in	combatting	Islamic	State	is	visible	
in	the	fact	that	it	has	been	able	to	withstand	its	powerful	enemies	for	
so	long	–	nearly	a	year	has	passed	since	the	June	offensive	–	but	while	
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Islamic	State’s	territorial	expansion	has	been	stopped	and	its	support	
base	is	being	consistently	destroyed,	the	vital	foundations	of	its	ex-
istence	have	not	been	touched.
1. The war on Islamic State
1.1. Lessons	from	the	war	on	terror	(the	war	against	al-	
-Qaeda)	and	the	US	operations	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq
The	experience	of	the	USA’s	‘global	war	on	terror’,	as	declared	in	
the	wake	of	the	attacks	on	11	September	2001,	has	had	a	direct	
impact	on	the	problem	of	eliminating	Islamic	State.	In	that	‘war’,	
al-Qaeda	 was	 the	 main	 target	 and	 Afghanistan,	 ruled	 by	 the	
Taliban	with	close	links	to	al-Qaeda,	was	the	main	theatre.	The	
USA	 administration	 quite	 quickly	 and	 effectively	 minimised	
the	risk	of	terror	attacks	on	US	territory	(no	major	attacks	have	
taken	place	there	since	2001),	effectively	disintegrated	both	al-
Qaeda’s	 organisational	 structures	 scattered	 around	 the	 world	
and	its	system	of	financing,	and	finally	–	once	the	political	deci-
sion	had	been	made	–	defeated	the	Taliban	state	within	several	
weeks,	and	almost	completely	destroyed	al-Qaeda’s	structures	in	
Afghanistan	within	 several	months.	 In	 Iraq,	 the	 situation	was	
fairly	similar	(even	if	the	scale	of	difficulty	was	greater):	when	
the	US	attacked	Saddam	Hussain’s	regime	in	2003,	it	crushed	it	
within	 a	month,	 and	by	 2007	 both	 Shia	 and	Sunni	 armed	 and	
terror	 groups	 had	 been	ultimately	 pacified.	Of	 course	 this	 did	
not	entirely	eliminate	the	problem	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	nor	
the	risk	of	terrorist	attacks	against	US	citizens	and	facilities	(e.g.	
embassies)	around	the	world,	but	undoubtedly	the	United	States	
managed	to	take	the	initiative	in	and	control	of	the	fight	against	
terrorism.
It	seems	that	in	those	two	cases	the	factors	that	played	a	key	role	
included	 the	 political	 will	 to	 carry	 the	 campaign	 through,	 the	
nearly	 unlimited	 military,	 financial	 and	 political	 means	 at	 the	
USA’s	disposal;	and	at	the	local	level,	the	deployment	of	US	forces	
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on	the	ground,	the	use	of	local	groups	hostile	to	al-Qaeda	and	the	
Taliban,	and	to	the	Shia	and	Sunni	radicals	in	Iraq,	and	finally,	the	
fact	that	there	existed	a	political	alternative	to	the	groups	backing	
the	radicals.
While	the	US	anti-terror	operations	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	dem-
onstrated	 that	 it	was	 indeed	possible	 to	 defeat	 and	marginalise	
terror	 organisations,	 they	 also	 showed	 equally	 clearly	 that	 the	
crushed	and	dispersed	groups	tended	to	have	a	remarkable	abil-
ity	to	adapt	to	new	conditions,	change	the	locations	and	forms	of	
their	activities,	and	to	regenerate	(especially	if	they	received	sup-
port	from	outside).	Those	operations	also	showed	that	the	durabil-
ity	and	stability	of	the	state	structures	and	order	in	the	countries	
affected	by	terrorism	(such	as	Iraq),	together	with	sustained	po-
litical	will	on	the	part	of	that	state	and	the	guarantor	of	its	stabil-
ity	(the	USA	in	this	case),	were	absolutely	decisive.
1.2. The	war	on	Islamic	State	in	2014–2015
The	 coalition	 which	 has	 been	 fighting	 Islamic	 State	 under	 US	
leadership	 (in	parallel	 to	 the	fight	against	 the	 IS	waged	by	 Iran	
and	its	clients)	has	a	number	of	assets	needed	to	achieve	the	ba-
sic	military	objectives,	 i.e.	destroying	 the	military	and	political	
structures	of	Islamic	State.	The	coalition	nominally	enjoys	strong	
political	backing	and	includes	more	than	60	states,	including	all	
the	states	of	the	Middle	East	with	the	exception	of	Iran,	Israel	and	
Oman,20	some	of	which	have	been	actively	taking	part	in	the	mili-
tary	operations	(mainly	air	strikes)	against	Islamic	State	in	Syria	
and	 Iraq	 (including	 Jordan,	Saudi	Arabia,	Bahrain,	United	Arab	
Emirates	and	Qatar).	The	coalition	members	have	an	overwhelm-
ing	military	and	financial	advantage	over	 Islamic	State.	Moreo-
ver,	a	number	of	 local	 forces	vitally	 interested	 in	destroying	 Is-
lamic	State	are	operating	directly	in	the	area	of	IS	activity,	among	
which	the	Kurds	(both	Iraqi	and	Syrian)	are	the	most	prominent.	
20	 http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm	
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One	can	also	assume	that	the	populations	in	the	areas	controlled	
by	IS	are	very	dissatisfied	with	its	rule.
However,	the	coalition	faces	a	number	of	obstacles,	among	which	
two	 fundamental	 problems	 are	 most	 notable.	 The	 first	 one	 is	
military	and	political.	In	the	previous	operations	in	Afghanistan	
and	especially	in	Iraq,	the	deployment	of	US	forces	on	the	ground	
was	the	factor	which	ultimately	secured	quick	military	success.	
Now	Washington	is	uninterested	in	such	a	solution:	air	strikes	
and	training	missions	are	underway,	but	no	regular	operations	
on	the	ground	are	taking	place	or	being	planned.	The	other	co-
alition	members	have	also	chosen	not	 to	 independently	deploy	
regular	 land	 forces	 in	Syria	and	 Iraq	since	 the	conflict	 started	
nearly	a	year	ago,	and	are	unlikely	to	do	so	in	the	future.21	In	both	
cases	there	is	no	political	will;	the	parties	concerned	are	aware	
of	the	high	financial	and	political	costs	of	such	an	operation,	and	
finally,	 the	key	problem	concerns	 the	 fear	of	what	would	hap-
pen	 ‘the	day	after	victory’	and	how	it	would	affect	the	dynam-
ics	 of	 the	 regional	 proxy	war.	This	 takes	us	 to	 the	 second	 and	
decisive	problem	that	the	coalition	is	facing,	namely	the	absence	
of	 a	 strategy	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 Iraq	 and	 Syria,	 as	 today	
embodied	by	Islamic	State.	The	experiences	of	last	decades	show	
that	it	is	possible	(albeit	not	optimal)	to	conduct	an	effective	op-
eration	based	on	local	forces	with	air	support	from	external	ac-
tors.	By	and	large,	this	is	how	the	operation	in	Afghanistan	was	
conducted,	 in	 which	 the	 Northern	 Alliance	 played	 a	 key	 role;	
the	same	applies	to	a	lesser	extent	to	the	operations	in	Iraq	(the	
Kurds	and	Shia	Muslims	during	the	First	Gulf	War;	Kurds	dur-
ing	the	Second	Gulf	War).	The	protracted	and	seemingly	cheap	
French-British	operation	in	Libya	in	2011	(in	which	US	support	
ultimately	turned	out	to	be	decisive)	was	also	similar	in	nature.	
21	 Nevertheless	the	Arab	states	quite	quickly	decided	to	carry	out	air	strikes	
and	operations	on	the	ground	against	the	Houthis	in	Yemen,	probably	be-
cause	they	had	a	greater	motivation	in	that	case,	and	there	was	agreement	
about	the	course	of	action	among	the	coalition	members	and	the	local	politi-
cal	and	military	partners.
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However,	 in	none	of	these	cases	was	 it	possible	to	stabilise	the	
situation	using	local	forces	after	the	enemy	was	defeated:	in	Af-
ghanistan	and	Iraq,	(temporary)	stability	could	only	be	achieved	
using	 a	massive	US	and	allied	military	presence,	 and	 in	Libya	
this	 element	was	missing	 altogether,	which	 caused	 a	 complete	
collapse	of	the	state	and	an	escalation	of	the	civil	war.	Today	one	
could	theoretically	imagine	a	scenario	in	which	the	Kurdish	and	
Shia	forces	seize	the	Iraqi	part	of	the	Islamic	State	territory,	but	
one	 should	 not	 expect	 this	 to	 lead	 to	 stabilisation	 or	 effective	
co-operation	with	the	disorganised	and	distrustful	Sunni-Arab	
population	and	the	local	elites.	In	the	case	of	Syria,	the	situation	
is	even	more	absurd:	Islamic	State	could	be	replaced	by	its	radical	
rivals	(al-Qaeda)	or	the	Assad	regime.	Any	attempts	by	the	neigh-
bouring	states	to	foster	new	local	political	and	military	forces	in	
the	area	occupied	by	Islamic	State	would	without	a	doubt	lead	to	
an	escalation	of	the	proxy	war	and	further	destabilise	the	entire	
region,	as	was	the	case	with	the	escalation	of	the	Iranian-Saudi	
conflict	just	before	IS’s	expansion,	and	even	more	evidently	with	
the	proxy	war	that	has	been	taking	place	in	Afghanistan	since	
the	1980s	(in	which	the	local	winner,	i.e.	Pakistan,	has	gradually	
changed	from	the	subject	of	that	regional	game	into	its	object).	
Finally,	as	the	history	of	Islamic	State	indicates,	it	is	highly	prob-
able	that	destroying	the	organisation’s	current	structures	would	
not	necessarily	mean	its	ultimate	elimination,	which	calls	into	
doubt	the	strategic	sense	of	such	an	operation.
In	 other	words,	 it	 seems	 that	 defeating	 Islamic	 State	militarily	
would	be	 a	 technically	 simple	 task	 if	 regular	 forces	 of	 external	
powers	 (especially	 the	United	States)	were	 involved,	and	a	rela-
tively	straightforward	one	if	 the	 local	 forces	combatting	IS	con-
solidated	 their	 efforts	 and	 received	 air	 support	 (in	 a	 variant	 of	
what	happened	 in	Libya	 in	2011).	Yet	 this	 task	 is	 extremely	dif-
ficult	to	carry	out	because	of	the	absence	of	political	will,	which	in	
turn	stems	from	the	awareness	of	the	costs	that	such	an	operation	
would	entail	and	the	challenges	that	would	emerge	immediately	
after	Islamic	State	collapsed.
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2. The war for peace in the Middle East
The	situation	appears	much	more	complicated	if	one	realises	that	
Islamic	State	is	merely	a	symptom,	and	not	the	cause	or	essence	of	
the	Middle	East’s	present	problems.	Defeating	Islamic	State	will	
not	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 terrorism	 and	will	 not	 end	 the	 armed	
conflicts	deeply	rooted	in	the	region’s	social	and	economic	crisis,	
the	crisis	of	values	and	identities,	and	the	crisis	of	the	social	and	
political	model	(including	the	state).	Even	if	Islamic	State	were	de-
feated,	 this	would	not	undo	the	breakdown	of	 the	Middle	East’s	
fragile	security	architecture,	nor	end	the	almost	open	war	involv-
ing	nearly	all	states	of	the	region	–	even	worse,	in	fact,	 it	would	
lend	a	new	impetus	to	the	proxy	war.	This	leads	back	to	the	ques-
tion,	long	pondered	in	the	West,	about	a	comprehensive	solution	
to	the	Middle	East’s	problems,	the	role	that	the	West	could	play	in	
it,	and	the	consequences	it	would	entail.
2.1. The	maximum	variant	–	Ex occidente lux
The	entrenched	assumption	about	the	Middle	East	in	the	West,	and	
one	to	which	so	far	no	alternative	has	so	far	been	proposed,	is	that	
the	Western	social	and	political	model	(democracy,	the	rule	of	law,	
free	markets,	etc.)	is	attractive	and	universal,	and	that	the	West’s	
political,	 economic,	 military	 and	 cultural	 power	 has	 been	 suffi-
cient	to	tie	the	Middle	East	to	the	West,	keeping	the	region	in	the	
Western	 orbit	 at	 least	 since	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Ottoman	Empire,	
through	the	Cold	War	until	the	present	day.	Indeed,	this	assump-
tion	has	been	shaping	the	region	and	its	states	for	the	last	century.	
The	end	of	the	Cold	War,	and	especially	the	emergence	of	the	terror	
threat	on	11	September	2001,	gave	new	impetus	to	the	question	of	
stabilisation	through	modernisation.	This	approach	was	put	to	the	
test	in	Iraq	for	the	Americans,	andin	North	Africa	and	the	Middle	
East	for	the	European	Union	(especially	in	the	context	of	the	Arab	
Spring),	as	well	as	in	Turkey,	which	played	a	dual	role	as	a	state	that	
modernised	along	Western	models	and	one	that	promoted	Western	
(albeit	‘Turkicised’)	values	and	solutions	in	the	Middle	East.
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2.2. A	transplant	of	stability	–	Iraq
The	operation	in	Iraq	(2003–2011)	was,	next	to	the	parallel	opera-
tion	 in	 Afghanistan,	 the	most	 ambitious	 attempt	 at	 comprehen-
sively	resolving	the	region’s	security,	political,	social	and	economic	
problems.	It	envisaged	military	action	(the	elimination	of	Saddam	
Hussain’s	regime,	and	then	the	fight	against	the	insurgents	and	ter-
ror	organisations)	and	the	creation	of	a	new	political	system	based	
on	a	constitution	that	would	simultaneously	respect	the	principles	
of	democracy	and	Islam.	As	part	of	this	programme,	the	old	regime	
was	to	be	held	accountable	(with	the	de-Ba’athification,	prosecution	
and	 convictions	 of	 the	 regime’s	 activists);	 hitherto	marginalised	
groups	(Shia	Muslims,	Kurds)	were	to	be	included	into	the	politi-
cal	mainstream,	and	the	problems	of	minorities	were	to	be	resolved	
(autonomy	for	the	Kurds).	Finally,	an	attempt	was	made	at	radically	
relaxing	regional	tensions	(by	exerting	immense	pressure	on	Iran,	
with	the	US	military	presence	in	the	region	as	a	containing	factor	
in	the	event	of	conflicts).	Theoretically,	given	such	a	broad	and	com-
prehensive	approach,	Washington’s	political	will	and	the	military	
and	financial	 resources	 committed,	 one	 could	have	 expected	 the	
overall	reconstruction	of	Iraq	to	be	successful,	leading	to	the	recon-
struction	and	stabilisation	of	the	entire	region	(which	was	Wash-
ington’s	deliberate	and	sought-after	objective).
As	we	know,	 the	project	 to	 reconstruct	 Iraq	has	 failed.	Leaving	
aside	the	factors	of	internal	politics	in	the	United	States	(the	politi-
cal	and	financial	cost,	the	human	losses,	public	fatigue,	the	change	
of	government,	etc.),	the	calculations	concerning	the	strength	of	
the	Iraqi	state	proved	wrong	(the	liquidation	of	the	regime	was	es-
sentially	tantamount	to	the	dismantling	of	the	state),	as	were	the	
estimates	of	the	strength	and	‘maturity’	of	the	political	counter-
elite	(especially	the	Shias,	who	were	being	simultaneously	played	
by	Washington	and,	more	importantly,	Tehran).	What	also	failed	
was	the	assessment	of	the	extent	to	which	the	principles	of	democ-
racy	could	be	adapted	to	the	conditions	of	a	smouldering	internal	
conflict	(the	rise	of	authoritarianism	under	Maliki’s	rule)	and	the	
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feasibility	of	creating	an	Arab	and	Sunni,	but	not	Ba’athist,	politi-
cal	 force.	The	positive	trends	which	first	became	visible	around	
2007	were	undone	by	Maliki.	The	attempts	at	creating	an	efficient	
federal	system	failed	due	to	Kurdistan’s	attempts	at	gaining	inde-
pendence,	constant	frictions	in	relations	with	Baghdad	as	well	as	
problems	originating	from	Baghdad’s	other	policies.
With	regard	to	the	current	situation	in	the	Middle	East,	the	Iraqi	
experience	appears	impossible	to	imitate,	both	because	of	the	lack	
of	political	will	and	means,	and	even	more	importantly,	because	
its	outcome	was	far	from	what	had	been	expected.
2.3. Stabilisation	and	reform	through	osmosis	–	Turkey	and	
the	Arab	Spring
Until	recently,	the	West	believed	that	a	policy	of	‘osmotic’	absorp-
tion	of	values,	standards	and	mechanisms,	aimed	at	a	gradual	but	
deep	transformation	of	the	Middle	East,	could	be	an	alternative	to	
an	ambitious	and	direct	policy	based	on	force,	of	which	the	Iraqi	
operation	was	 an	 example.	 Turkey	 has	 been	 the	most	 complete	
example	of	this	approach,	as	a	NATO	member	bordering	Europe,	
interested	 in	modernisation	and	aspiring	 to	membership	 in	 the	
EU.	Despite	all	the	mutual	doubts,	misunderstandings	and	incon-
sistencies,	against	the	regional	backdrop	Turkey	definitely	looks	
like	a	model	of	success	in	building	a	modern	and	gradually	democ-
ratising	state.
Since	 the	 AKP	 came	 to	 power	 in	 2002,	 Turkey	 has	 also	 been	
a	country	that	combines	the	European	experience	and	local	tra-
ditions,	including	Islam	in	particular	(the	AKP	portrays	itself	as	
a	synthesis	of	modernisation,	democratisation	and	conservatism	
rooted	in	Islam).
Turkey	has	been	regarded	by	the	West,	by	itself	and,	over	the	past	
decade,	often	also	by	the	public	and	elites	in	the	Middle	East,	as	
a	positive	inspiration	to	transformation.	It	was	assumed	that	the	
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Middle	 East	 could	 be	 stabilised	 and	 developed	 through	 neigh-
bourly	relations	and	soft-power	instruments,	as	was	the	case	with	
Turkey	and	had	been	the	case	with	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
after	1989,	which	led	the	EU	to	formulate	and	implement	the	so-
-called	Barcelona	Process	(1995)	which	over	time	evolved	into	the	
Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(2008).
The	Arab	 Spring,	which	 started	 in	December	 2010	 and	 affected	
all	 the	Arab	 states	 to	varying	degrees,	became	 (in	an	apparent-
ly	unplanned	way)	 inscribed	 into	 the	hopes	 for	an	evolutionary	
transformation	 of	 the	 Middle	 East.	 The	 Arab	 Spring	 was	 seen	
as	 a	 grassroots,	 pro-democratic,	 and	 consequently	 pro-Western	
movement	for	change,	of	which	Turkey	felt	it	was	the	patron.	Ex-
isting	regimes	were	 toppled	 in	Tunisia,	Egypt,	Libya	 (thanks	 to	
military	support	from	the	West)	and	in	Yemen;	in	some	cases	lim-
ited	reforms	were	undertaken	(Morocco,	 Jordan).	 In	most	coun-
tries,	violent	riots	took	place,	with	long-lasting	consequences.	Fi-
nally,	in	Syria	(as	well	as	Libya	and	Yemen),	a	civil	war	broke	out	
which	has	continued	until	the	present	day,	and	Egypt	underwent	
a	counterrevolutionary	coup.
The	Arab	Spring	put	an	end	to	any	illusions	about	the	feasibil-
ity	of	gradual	reform	in	the	region	that	would	be	at	least	loosely	
based	on	Western	values.	The	democratic	and	secular	communi-
ties	turned	out	to	have	been	too	weak	to	manage	the	Arab	Spring	
to	their	advantage.	Even	the	specific	credit	of	confidence	that	the	
West	awarded	to	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	Egypt	(and	Syria)	
turned	 out	 to	have	been	misplaced:	 even	 the	Muslim	Brother-
hood	was	unable	to	hold	onto	power,	and	the	new-old	elites,	hav-
ing	staged	a	successful	coup,	were	unable	to	offer	anything	but	
a	restoration	of	 the	old	system.	The	region’s	political	scene	be-
came	polarised:	on	the	one	hand	there	are	the	forces	with	links	
to	the	old	regime,	and	on	the	other	the	Salafi	communities	which	
are	much	more	radical	than	the	Muslim	Brothers.	This	has	ex-
acerbated	the	crises	within	individual	states	and	throughout	the	
Middle	East.
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Paradoxically,	 the	West,	 including	 both	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 USA,	 has	
started	to	treat	Turkey	with	increasing	distrust.	The	process	of	its	in-
tegration	with	the	EU	slowed	down	considerably.	Turkey	itself	devel-
oped	an	ambition	to	find	its	own	way	(which	has	also	become	visible	
in	its	regional	policy),	and	thus	started	to	drift	away	from	the	West;	
and	finally,	it	is	simultaneously	experiencing	a	rise	of	authoritarian	
tendencies	and	rising	political,	social	and	ideological	tensions.
From	the	perspective	of	2015,	one	is	justified	in	fearing	that	the	as-
sumption	that	the	Middle	East	could	be	effectively	modernised	on	
the	basis	of	Western	models	and	thence	durably	stabilised	is	base-
less.	Neither	Washington	nor	Brussels	(or	Berlin)	have	the	vision,	
political	will	and	the	necessary	means,	and	in	the	Middle	East	it-
self	 (with	 the	 sole	 exception	of	Tunisia)	 the	 elites	 and	public	 are	
not	interested	in	Western	solutions.	Neither	does	a	strong	political	
(i.e.	primarily	 state)	 infrastructure	exist	which	could	absorb	 the	
West’s	 efforts.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 great	 hopes	 and	many	 postulates	
put	 forward,	no	attractive	alternative	has	emerged	to	 the	radical	
tendencies	within	Islam,	which	defines	the	axis	of	the	conflict	as	
a	fundamental	opposition	between	the	West	and	Islam.	The	crea-
tion	and	expansion	of	Islamic	State	only	testifies	to	the	strength	of	
the	radical	tendencies,	and	exposes	the	weakness	and	inefficacy	of	
the	efforts	that	the	West	has	hitherto	made	towards	Islam.
3. The strategy of containment
The	end	of	2011	was	a	symbolic	moment	marked	by	a	final	break-
through	in	the	West’s	approach	to	the	Middle	East;	at	that	point	
the	 ultimate	withdrawal	 of	US	 forces	 from	 Iraq	 coincided	with	
a	sense	of	disappointment	with	 the	outcome	of	 the	Arab	Spring	
and	the	outbreak	of	the	civil	war	in	Syria.
Since	 then,	 the	West	 has	 realised	 that	 it	 had	 lost	 whatever	 in-
itiative	 in	 the	 region	 it	may	 still	have	had.	 It	has	 since	been	on	
the	 defensive,	 supporting	 the	 existing	 states	 (with	 the	 excep-
tion	of	Syria),	 cautiously	 tried	 to	support	 those	non-state	actors	
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considered	to	be	pro-Western,	and	to	slow	down	and	contain	the	
processes	 that	posed	a	 threat	 to	 the	existence	of	certain	Middle	
Eastern	states.	This	stance	has	also	been	visible	in	the	approach	to	
Islamic	State:	the	principal	objectives	have	been	to	stop	its	terri-
torial	expansion,	and	to	mobilise	and	support	the	IS’s	opponents,	
with	the	United	States	playing	an	auxiliary	and	regulatory	role	in	
the	process.	The	West’s	awareness	of	its	own	limitations	and	the	
potential	costs	of	tougher	action	have	been	preventing	any	more	
ambitious	attempts	at	resolving	the	underlying	problems.
3.1. Demonic	dilemmas:	Iran	and	Kurdistan
The	fight	against	Islamic	State,	as	well	as	the	need	to	protect	sta-
bility	in	the	Middle	East	and	retain	some	instruments	to	influence	
the	 dynamically	 changing	 situation	 in	 the	 region,	 have	 posed	
some	fundamental	challenges	and	dilemmas.	In	particular,	these	
concern	a	choice	between	defending	the	existing	regional	order	
as	a	matter	of	principle,	or	accepting	and	 joining	 the	process	of	
change	 –	 in	 effect,	 helping	 the	disintegration	 of	 the	 old	 order.22	
Iran,	Kurdistan	and	Israel,	as	well	as	the	West’s	allies	in	the	Per-
sian	Gulf,	play	a	key	role	in	this	respect.
3.1.1. Iran
In	Western	political	logic,	especially	that	of	the	US,	Iran	has	been	
the	Middle	 East’s	 key	 problem	 for	more	 than	 thirty	 years.	 It	 is	
considered	to	be	the	state	which:
	– is	hostile	to	the	West	and	its	allies	in	the	region	(Iran	has	open-
ly	threatened	to	annihilate	Israel),
	– has	been	actively	fanning	instability	in	its	surroundings	(for	
instance	by	supporting	anti-governmental	forces	from	Iraq	to	
Bahrain	and	to	Yemen),
22	 To	some	extent,	this	is	the	same	dilemma	that	Turkey	faced	several	years	
ago,	with	consequences	that	still	significantly	influence	its	policy	today.
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	– has	been	instrumental	in	the	development	of	Islamic	terror-
ism	in	the	region	(by	having	created	Hezbollah,	supported	the	
Palestinian	Sunni	groupings,	and	tactically	co-operated	with	
al-Qaeda),
	– has	been	instrumental	in	the	development	of	global	terrorism	
(with	attacks	on	Jewish	targets	from	Buenos	Aires	in	1994	to	
Burgas	in	2012	attributed	to	Iranian	influence),	and
	– has	been	actively	developing	its	nuclear	and	missile	programmes	
in	order	to	radically	alter	the	balance	of	power	in	the	region.
In	recent	years,	Iran	has	been	accused	inter alia	of	escalating	the	
tensions	in	Iraq	(both	those	that	were	targeted	against	US	actions	
before	 2011	 and	 those	which	 fanned	 the	 Shia-Sunni	 conflict,	 as	
a	result	of	which	Islamic	State	came	into	being),	and	of	providing	
decisive	 support	 to	 the	Assad	 regime	 in	 its	brutal	 struggle,	 ini-
tially	against	the	public	at	large,	and	then	against	the	opposition.
From	this	point	of	view,	Iran	is	the	focus	of	nearly	all	problems	of	
the	Middle	East,	and	countering	Iran	(the	Iranian	regime	and	its	
policies)	is	(or	should	be)	the	basic	and	unchangeable	priority	of	
the	West’s	actions	concerning	the	Middle	East.
On	the	other	hand,	there	is	a	growing	awareness	that	over	thirty	
years	of	marginalising	and	countering	Iran	has	not	produced	any	
effects	 (paradoxically,	 Iran’s	 position	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 is	 the	
strongest	 it	 has	 been	 in	 centuries).	 Iran’s	 policy	 and	 ambitions	
cannot	be	reduced	to	the	present	regime’s	line	(the	revolutionary	
component	has	lost	part	of	its	significance	to	the	benefit	of	a	Real-
politik	 that	would	presumably	be	continued	by	 the	hypothetical	
successors	of	the	current	regime).	Moreover,	today	it	is	not	Iran	
that	 is	behind	real	 terrorism,	but	 rather	 its	deadly	enemies.	Fi-
nally,	the	Iranian	nuclear	programme	may	be	treated	as	a	politi-
cal	instrument	(a	way	to	raise	the	country’s	status	and	deterrence	
potential),	and	not	necessarily	as	a	real	military	threat.
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In	 practice,	 Iran	 is	 also	 the	West’s	 tactical	 ally	 in	 the	 struggle	
against	Islamic	State	(and	one	that	is	presumably	much	more	ac-
tive	as	far	as	ground	operations	are	concerned)	and	in	the	efforts	
to	stabilise	Iraq	(the	Baghdad-controlled	Shia	part).	Finally,	 it	 is	
the	protector	of	the	Assad	regime,	or	whatever	is	left	of	the	Syr-
ian	state,	which	may	be	troublesome	but	is	nonetheless	a	state,	to	
which	at	the	moment	there	is	no	alternative.
This	 perspective	 is	 increasingly	 visible	 in	 the	 US	 administra-
tion’s	activities	concerning	Iran;	the	pressure	on	Assad	is	limited,	
and	proposals	for	a	political	solution	have	been	put	forward	that	
would	take	into	account	the	interests	of	both	Assad	and	Iran.	Tac-
tical	US-Iranian	co-operation	in	the	fight	against	Islamic	State	in	
Iraq	 takes	place	on	a	 regular	basis.	Most	 importantly,	however,	
the	prospects	of	a	deal	between	the	West	and	Iran	on	the	Iranian	
nuclear	programme	are	a	sign	of	a	coming	breakthrough,	visible	
in	the	fact	that	Washington	has	ceased	making	military	threats	
against	 Iran	and	has	been	determined	 to	continue	negotiations,	
leading	to	the	announcement	on	2	April	2015	of	a	preliminary	nu-
clear	agreement	between	Iran	and	the	West	(mainly	the	USA).
At	the	time	of	writing	it	remains	an	open	question	whether	a	final	
agreement	can	be	reached	and	effectively	implemented,	and	the	
criticisms	that	have	been	expressed	by	the	Republican	opposition	
in	the	USA	and	elements	of	the	Iranian	elite	are	serious.	However,	
there	is	a	clear	will	to	achieve	a	strategic	breakthrough,	both	on	
the	part	of	the	White	House	and	the	Iranian	government.	This	ap-
proach,	however,	runs	counter	to	the	fundamental	assumptions	of	
the	West’s	policy	towards	the	region	(calling	for	an	admission	that	
the	assessments	of	Iran	have	so	far	been	wrong,	or	that	the	West	
has	failed	in	its	efforts	to	act	on	correct	assumptions).	It	spells	the	
beginning	of	the	end	of	alliances	with	states	in	the	region	founded	
on	a	fear	of	Iran	or	on	US	protection.	Finally,	it	may	mean	granting	
Iran	the	right	to	expand	its	own	sphere	of	influence	in	the	Middle	
East	at	the	expense	of	the	old	order,	which	would	entail	an	escala-
tion	of	the	region’s	proxy	war.
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As	 far	 as	 the	 fight	 against	 Islamic	 State	 is	 directly	 concerned,	
Iran’s	 usefulness	 for	 the	 West	 and	 the	 coalition	 is	 disputable.	
Undoubtedly,	 Iran	 should	be	 credited	 for	 stopping	 IS’s	offensive	
in	Iraq,	and	for	some	successes	in	pushing	the	terrorists	back	in	
Syria	and	 Iraq.	 In	practice,	however,	 this	has	meant	expanding	
Iran’s	protectorate	over	Iraq.	One	could	also	be	concerned	at	the	
efficacy	of	 Iran’s	actions	 (whether	direct	or	carried	out	 through	
Shia	militias)	in	traditionally	Sunni	areas	that	are	hostile	to	Iran	
and	 the	Shias.	The	prospects	 that	 those	areas	could	not	only	be	
seized	but	also	pacified	and	re-integrated	with	the	Iraqi	state	are	
dim	(by	the	way,	Assad	and	Iran	have	not	been	able	to	achieve	any	
more	in	Syria),	while	the	prospect	of	undermining	Iraq’s	fragile	
integrity	is	clear.
3.1.2. Kurdistan
While	 Iran	 today	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 state	 that	 has	 benefited	most	
from	the	decomposition	of	the	Middle	Eastern	order,	the	Kurds,	
especially	those	in	Iraq	and	Syria,	seem	to	be	the	main	non-state	
beneficiaries,	next	to	Islamic	State.
In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 traditional	 assumptions	 about	 the	Middle	
East,	the	emergence	of	the	Kurdish	para-state	in	Iraq	–	with	genu-
ine	political	legitimacy	(both	internal	and	external),	an	efficient	
administration,	 strong	military	 formations,	 strategic	 economic	
resources	(oil	and	gas,	and	infrastructures	for	their	export),	and	
its	territorial	expansion	–	are	a	clear	sign	that	that	the	principle	
of	legitimism	is	crumbling	in	the	Middle	East.	In	view	of	the	fact	
that	 similar	 processes	 have	 been	 taking	 place	 in	 neighbouring	
Syria	–	the	rise	in	the	increasingly	battle-hardened	de facto	auton-
omy	of	the	Syrian	Kurds,	developed	by	the	PKK,	which	is	broad-
ly	considered	to	be	a	terror	organisation,	and	the	ambitions	and	
potential	of	the	Turkish	Kurds,	 likewise	dominated	by	the	PKK,	
have	also	been	growing	–	the	problem	is	acquiring	serious	politi-
cal	significance.	Preventing	any	changes	to	borders,	and	in	par-
ticular	blocking	Kurdish	separatism,	has	for	decades	been	a	pillar	
of	the	co-operation	between	those	states	with	Kurdish	minorities,	
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i.e.	Turkey,	Iraq	and	Syria.	Massud	Barzani,	the	president	of	the	
Kurdish	Regional	Government	in	Iraq,	said	in	June	2014	that	the	
vision	 of	 an	 independent	 Kurdistan	was	 closer	 to	 fulfilment	 in	
recent	years	than	it	had	ever	been	throughout	the	history	of	the	
Kurds	(although	he	withdrew	the	claim	in	view	of	IS	advances).	
An	independent	Kurdistan	would	deepen	and	perpetuate	the	de-
composition	of	the	states	in	the	region	(Iraq	and	Syria),	perpetuate	
the	risk	of	further	destabilisation,	and	exacerbate	the	proxy	war.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Kurdish	 para-states,	 and	 especially	 the	
Kurdish	regional	government	in	Iraq,	seem	to	be	a	fulfilment	of	
the	dreams	of	Western	elites,	ranging	from	the	liberals	to	the	US	
neoconservatives	 of	 some	 time	ago,	 and	an	antithesis	 to	 the	 re-
gion’s	main	problems.	Here	we	have	an	efficient	political	entity,	
capable	of	establishing	effective	para-state	structures,	which	has	
emerged	 in	conditions	of	 the	growing	chaos,	disintegration	and	
decomposition	of	the	regional	order,	and	has	been	created	mostly	
by	political	means.	Despite	all	its	(significant)	shortcomings,	this	
entity	is	evolving	towards	democratic	standards	and	the	rule	of	
law.	While	strongly	rooted	in	Islam	and	facing	an	external	pres-
sure,	the	Kurdish	para-state	remains	politically	secular	(in	Syr-
ia,	even	firmly	secular)	and	firmly	West-oriented,	and	has	been	
adopting	Western	standards.	A	similar	trend	is	visible	among	the	
Turkish	Kurds;	they	are	abandoning	armed	struggle,	which	until	
now	they	had	seen	the	only	option,	and	are	developing	political	
formations	and	social	movements	that	seek	for	solutions	within	
Turkish	law	and	the	constitutional	political	process,	while	being	
strongly	 oriented	 towards	 integration	with	 the	 EU.	 Finally,	 the	
Kurds	 at	 large	have	been,	 and	will	probably	firmly	 remain,	 op-
posed	to	the	radical	(and	terrorist)	forces	in	the	region,	including	
Islamic	State.	Their	involvement	in	radical	movements	has	been	
negligible;	 they	have	demonstrated	a	 remarkable	ability	 to	pre-
vent	 terror	acts	 in	 the	 territories	 they	control,	 and	have	 shown	
unshaken	determination	in	countering	Islamic	State’s	offensive.	
In	other	words,	the	Kurds	seem	to	be	a	natural	and	committed	ally	
of	the	West	–	a	unique	phenomenon	in	the	region	–	who	might	be	
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able	 to	preserve	 stability	 in	 the	areas	 they	control,	 and	provide	
crucial	support	in	the	actions	against	the	Islamic	State.
In	the	context	of	the	fight	against	Islamic	State,	the	Kurds	seem	
to	be	a	credible	bulwark	against	the	Islamic	State’s	expansion	(as	
long	as	they	receive	assistance	from	outside),	and	could	potential-
ly	make	up	a	key	element	of	the	land	forces	that	would	be	tasked	
with	reclaiming	territory	from	the	terrorists’	hands.	However,	it	
would	be	an	 illusion	to	believe	 that	 they	could	be	 the	main	and	
independent	force	in	the	struggle	against	Islamic	State,	and	it	is	
even	more	unlikely	that	they	could	effectively	relax	the	tensions	
that	would	follow	a	hypothetical	victory	over	IS,	administer	such	
areas	either	independently	or	in	co-operation	with	the	forces	in	
Baghdad,	or	finally,	withstand	a	hypothetical	open	aggression	by	
the	local	powers,	i.e.	Iran	and	Turkey,	without	significant	support	
from	outside.
3.2. Old	allies
A	US-guaranteed	equilibrium	among	the	individual	states	in	the	
Middle	East	has	been	the	foundation	of	the	elementary	stability	
and	 predictability	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 in	 recent	
decades.	The	states	which	played	a	special	role	in	this	system	in-
cluded	Turkey,	Israel,	Egypt	and	Saudi	Arabia	(which	dominated	
the	Arab	part	of	the	Persian	Gulf).	In	line	with	this	system’s	logic,	
a	strategy	of	containment	should	be	based	on	these	states,	while	
also	 taking	 into	 account	 smaller	 but	 important	 states	 such	 as	
Jordan,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	or	Qatar.	In	recent	years,	how-
ever,	the	principal	community	of	 interests	between	those	states	
and	the	West	has	been	eroding	as	a	result	of	 the	allies’	 internal	
problems	(for	instance	in	the	case	of	Egypt),	their	strategic	reas-
sessments	 (Turkey’s	 rising	 ambitions,	 or	 the	mounting	 existen-
tial	 threats	 against	 Israel	 and	 its	 growing	 isolation),	 inter-state	
tensions	 (the	proxy	war;	 differences	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 outside	
threats,	 for	 instance	 between	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Qatar),	 Iran’s	
pressure,	the	USA’s	eroding	position,	and	many	other	factors.	It	is	
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a	legitimate	concern	that	presently,	the	strategy	of	containment	
is	increasingly	focused	not	so	much	on	using	the	allies	to	stop	the	
threats	coming	from	Syria,	 Iraq	or	Islamic	State,	as	on	stopping	
the	processes	 that	 could	undermine	 the	 internal	 stability	of	 in-
dividual	states	(e.g.	the	frontline	state	of	Jordan)	or	the	relations	
among	those	states	and	their	relations	with	the	West	(especially	
the	United	States).
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conclusions
The	situation	in	the	Middle	East	is	extremely	dynamic,	and	any	
attempts	at	forecasting	future	developments	are	subject	to	a	huge	
margin	of	error.	The	future	of	Islamic	State	remains	an	open	ques-
tion	–	its	political	and	military	structures	may	well	be	destroyed.	
However,	it	seems	impossible	that	all	the	problems	which	Islamic	
State	 embodies	will	 be	 eliminated.	 It	 is	 therefore	 quite	 certain	
that	even	in	a	most	optimistic	scenario	in	which	IS	is	destroyed,	
new	problems	of	a	similar	scale	will	emerge.
The	balance	of	power	in	the	region	is	also	an	open	question.	This	
refers	in	particular	to	the	prospects	of	a	political	solution	to	the	
problem	of	relations	between	Iran	and	the	West.	Yet	even	if	such	
a	 solution	 is	 found,	 tensions	 in	 the	 region	will	 remain,	 and	 the	
situation	could	even	deteriorate	further.	There	is	likewise	no	cer-
tainty	about	the	domestic	situations	affecting	external	and	secu-
rity	policy	in	the	other	states	of	the	region,	for	example	in	Turkey,	
which	expects	particularly	important	parliamentary	elections	in	
June	2015.
Islamic	State	and	the	problems	of	the	Middle	East	associated	with	
it	remain	very	important	and	very	dangerous	for	Europe.	The	re-
gion	 is	destabilising;	 the	risk	of	conflicts	and	terrorism	 is	on	 the	
rise,	and	the	paradigms	of	thinking	about	and	acting	in	the	region,	
which	have	been	in	place	for	a	century,	are	changing.	Meanwhile,	
the	scale	of	the	migration	from	the	region	to	the	European	Union	
and	the	spread	of	radical	Islam	(of	which	the	terrorist	threat	and	
the	people	who	set	out	from	Europe	to	join	the	jihad	in	the	Middle	
East	 are	 evidence)	 constitute	 a	 key	Middle	 East-related	 security	
problem	for	the	West.	It	seems	that	the	West’s	actions	towards	the	
Middle	East	in	recent	decades	call	for	radical	revision	(because	they	
have	produced	very	limited	positive	effects).	The	UE	and	NATO	to-
day	are	not	prepared	to	act	effectively	because	there	is	a	mismatch	
between	the	nature	of	the	problems	at	hand	and	the	underlying	ob-
jectives	that	NATO	and	the	UE	were	created	to	address.
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Some	action	seems	to	be	necessary,	but	first	and	foremost,	deep	
reflection	on	the	nature	of	the	Middle	East’s	problems	(taking	into	
account	 the	 identity	 and	civilisational	 aspects)	 is	 essential,	 and	
even	more	importantly,challenges	of	this	sort	within	the	EU	itself	
should	be	noted,	and	an	adequate	response	should	be	developed	
both	at	the	level	of	individual	member	states	and	Union-wide.
At	least	for	the	EU,	this	seems	to	be	an	important	part	of	inevitable	
reassessments,	next	to	those	concerning	the	pace	and	directions	
of	integration,	financial	stability	and	climate	policy.
Krzysztof strachota
The text was closed in early April 2015
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2.	Middle	East	–	religion	map
source:	Author’s	estimatess	based	on	The	Gulf/2000	Project;	http://gulf2000.
columbia.edu/images/maps/Mid_East_Religion_lg.png
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3.	Middle	East	–	ethnic	map
source:	Author’s	estimates	based	on	The	Gulf/2000	Project;	http://gulf2000.
columbia.edu/images/maps/Mid_East_Ethnic_sm.png
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4.	Islamic	State	and	situation	in	Syria	and	Iraq	(spring	2015)
source:	Author’s	estimates	based	on	Institute	for	the	Study	of	War	and	media	
publications	(BBC,	The Economist,	etc.)
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5.	Middle	East	instability	and	military	conflicts	(2005-2005)
source:	Author’s	estimates
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6.	Middle	East	–	the	problem	of	state	control	over	its	territory
source:	Author’s	estimates
